Infinite games with perfect information by ZHANG WENZHANG
INFINITE GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
ZHANG WENZHANG
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2006




FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2006
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Xiaolin Xing, for his many sugges-
tions and constant support during this research.
The committee members, Dr. Younghwan In and Dr. Yohanes Eko Riyanto,
have provided very helpful comments and suggestions.
The University Research Scholarship, which was awarded to me for the period
2004–2006, and the President’s Graduate Fellowship, which was awarded to me for






1.1 The literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Structure of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Summary of Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Summary of Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.5 Summary of Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Games with Perfect Information 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 An outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.2 The related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Definitions and Main Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 The Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.1 First Axiom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.2 Second Axiom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3 Third Axiom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Determinacy of finite games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
i
2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5.1 Interpretation of determinacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5.2 Comparison with the usual backward induction . . . . . . . 26
2.5.3 Comparison with weak dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5.4 Comparison with subgame perfect Nash equilibrium . . . . . 28
2.5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.6.1 Ordinals and the complete version of determinacy . . . . . . 30
2.6.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2.12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.6.4 Proof of Theorem 2.6.33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6.5 Proof of Theorem 2.5.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.6.6 Proof of Theorem 2.6.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3 PI-Games with Infinitely Many Players 62
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 PI-games with an Infinite Number of Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3 The Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.2 Step 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.3 Step 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4 An Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4 Effective Determinacy 77
ii
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Turing Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3 Effective Determinacy of PI-games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4 A Characterization of Effective Determinacy of Closed Games . . . 85




Figure 1, Page 9
Figure 2, Page 10
Figure 3, Page 22
Figure 4, Page 28
Figure 5, Page 60
Figure 6, Page 61
iv
Summary
This thesis studies infinite games with perfect information, i.e., dynamic games in
which players move sequentially.
Chapter 1 introduces the subject.
In Chapter 2 we consider the class of two-player perfect information games with
characteristic payoff functions. We define a new solution concept for these games.
The approach is axiomatic. We prove the determinacy for a whole class of perfect
information games.
In Chapter 3 we introduce infinite perfect-information games with an infinite
number of players. We also define a corresponding notion of determinacy for these
games. An application to a simple overlapping generation model predicts monetary
equilibrium as the only outcome of the economy.
In Chapter 4 we consider an effective version of determinacy for infinite games
with perfect information by combining determinacy with the notion of computabil-
ity by a Turing machine. We give a characterization of the determinacy for the




This thesis studies infinite games with perfect information, i.e., dynamic games
in which players move sequentially. This class of games have been widely used
in modeling economic activities. For example, Rubinstein (1982) uses an infinite
two-person game with perfect information to settle the indeterminacy of bilateral
bargaining over the gains from trade, Shaked and Sutton (1984) use infinite games
to study involuntary unemployment and strike activity.
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the most widely used solution concept
in dynamic games. A fundamental difficulty in applying this concept is that it
predicts a large number of equilibria in many games. For example it is known that
there is a three-person bargaining game in which any outcome can be supported
as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The thesis focuses on refining subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for infinite
games with perfect information.
1
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1.1 The literature
The theory of infinite games has been approached from two quite different perspec-
tives: the economic and the mathematical perspectives.
Mathematicians studied infinite games much earlier than economists. Gale and
Stewart (1953) is the first systematic study of win-lose games. A two-player game
is called a win-lose game if the payoffs of the players always sum up to 1. That is,
in any play of the game, one and only one player wins. A win-lose game is called
determined if one of the players has a winning strategy. Gale and Stewart (1953)
proves the fundamental result that all games with closed or open payoff sets are
determined. They also ask whether all games with Borel payoff sets are determined.
After many years of studies (Wolfe (1955), Davis (1963)), this was finally confirmed
by Martin (1975). The study of determinacy of win-lose games is also found to be
closely related to the foundation of mathematics (see, e.g., Kanamori (2000)).
The studies of infinite games in economics starts with Rubinstein’s seminal
contribution to the bargaining problem. The settlement of various gains from
trade is a fundamental problem in economics. Rubinstein (1982) approaches this
problem through a bilateral bargaining process.
The story is told in the form of the division of a unite pie. Two players, 1 and
2, are bargaining over the partition of a pie. They take turns making proposals
as to how it should be divided. In the first period player 1 proposes a partition,
player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal; if he accepts then the game ends,
otherwise they move to next period in which player 2 in turn proposes a partition
to which player 1 replies; and so on.
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In order for the players to have incentive to reach an agreement, certain as-
sumptions on time preferences has to be imposed. In particular, if an agreement is
never reached, each player gets nothing. Thus the bargaining process becomes an
infinite game.
Rubinstein employs the notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which
works both for finite and for infinite games (Selten (1965, 1975)), to study this
game. The striking result is that under reasonable assumptions on time preferences
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is unique.
Attempts to generalize this result to the n-person case have been less successful.
Shaked shows (reported in Sutton (1986) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)) that
in a three-person bargaining game in which the players are sufficiently patient, any
partition of the pie can be supported as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. But
since then the use of infinite games in economics has been popular.
The mathematical studies have focused on zero-sum games and economists are
interested only in non-zero-sum games. The studies in the economic side are mainly
in the form of applications and examples. As far as we know, there is no systematic
study of non-zero-sum games focusing on the infinite case.
Our study encompasses both perspectives. It is intended to be general and it
covers the non-zero-sum games. We borrow techniques and terminologies from the
mathematical literature and study games of interests both to economists and to
mathematicians.
Detailed comparisons with related papers will be given in specific chapters. The
rest of this chapter summaries the main results of each following chapter.
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The main body of this thesis consists of three chapters: chapter 2, chapter 3 and
chapter 4.
Chapter 2 and 3 study Non-zero-sum games. Chapter 2 deals with two player
games with characteristic payoff functions. In chapter 3, the games under consid-
eration are quite general: we allow arbitrary number, including infinitely many,
of players and arbitrary payoff functions. The main purpose is to define a notion
of determinacy for non-zero-sum games as a refinement of subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Chapter 4 studies two-person zero-sum games. The main purpose is to define
an effective version of determinacy.
Chapter 4 can be read independently. It would be better to read chapter 2
before proceeding to chapter 3 although they are, strictly speaking, independent.
1.3 Summary of Chapter 2
Chapter 2 We consider the class of two-player perfect information games with
characteristic payoff functions. Motivated by several simple examples in which
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium fails to single out a unique equilibrium, we
propose three behavioral axioms. Building on these axioms we develop a new
solution concept termed determinacy. Intuitively, a game is determined if it can
be solved by repeatedly applying these behavioral axioms. Moreover, determinacy
turns out to be a unique refinement of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the sense
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that the outcome of a determined game is always unique and can be supported
by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Closed games are games such that the
underlying sets for the characteristic payoff functions are closed. We show that all
closed games are determined. That is,determinacy solves a whole class of games.
1.4 Summary of Chapter 3
Chapter 3 introduces infinite perfect-information games with an infinite number
of players. Many of the dynamic models in economics involve an infinite number
of individuals. And interactions among the individuals play a crucial role there.
Therefore in macroeconomics, quite often the model is infinite horizontal and in-
finite generations of individuals are involved. Moreover, the decisions of current
generations have an impact on that of the future generations. Ideally we should
formulate these situations using pure game-theoretic frameworks and apply the
game-theoretic solution concepts to derive the relevant economic outcomes. But
neither the framework of games with an infinite number of players is founded nor
are appropriate solution concepts available.
In this paper, we develop the notion of a perfect information game with an
infinite number of players. We also define a solution concept for this, namely
the notions of determinacy, value and rational strategies. All these are natural
extensions of the theory developed for infinite perfect-information games with a
finite number of players.
We also present an application of this theory to a variant of Samuelson’s Over-
lapping Generation Model. In contrast with the original derivation, this theory
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predicts the monetary equilibrium as the unique equilibrium.
1.5 Summary of Chapter 4
Chapter 4 defines an effective version of determinacy for infinite games with perfect
information and characterizes the determinacy of closed games.
Turing machine has been one of the main tools in modeling bounded ratio-
nality in game theory. Intuitively, a Turing machine is a computer program that
can be implemented by an ideal computer with no restriction on time and space.
The main idea is that in many contexts, the players are not capable of playing
strategies of arbitrary complexities. A natural idea of a strategy being simple is a
strategy that is implementable by a Turing machine. Hence viewed from bounded
rationality perspective, the class of Turing machine implementable strategies is a
natural restriction on the strategies that can be used in a game.
Besides being a useful tool in modeling bounded rationality, there are practical
uses of considering Turing machine implementable strategies. In many practical
situations the agents playing the game, like computers, machines, robotics, are
basically controlled by computer programs. So Turing machine implementable
strategies are the right class of strategies to consider in these situations.
This chapter introduces an effective version of determinacy for infinite games
with perfect information using the notion of computability (by Turing machines).
We also give a characterization of effective determinacy for closed games.
Chapter 2
Games with Perfect Information
2.1 Introduction
Games with perfect information are dynamic games in which players move sequen-
tially, i.e., no simultaneous moves. This chapter concerns the class of two-player
perfect information games with characteristic payoff functions. That is, a player’s
payoff function can be represented by the characteristic function of a set: at the
end of the game, if the sequence of choices lies in this set then the player’s payoff
is 1; otherwise his payoff is 0. In the former case we say that this player wins and
he loses in the latter case. So at the end of a play a player either wins or loses; and
it is possible that the players both win or both lose.
There are already several solution concepts applicable to this class of games in
the literature. For the case of finite games, one can apply the backward induction
algorithm (Zermelo (1913), Kuhn (1953)). In general, one can apply subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (Selten 1965, 1975), which has been the most widely used
7
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solution concept for more general games of perfect information. By insisting that
in equilibrium the strategies players used should depend only on payoff relevant
histories, one has the notion of Markov subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (see
Maskin and Tirole (2001)).
Practice of these solution concepts have shown thatthough they are useful in
many applications, there are still many other situations in which they are prob-
lematic. The most serious one is that they usually predict a large set of equilibria.
This chapter constructs a different solution concept for the class of two player PI-
games with characteristic payoff functions. It has the desired property of always
predicting a unique payoff vector.
Our approach is axiomatic. We start with simple examples where it is clear
enough what the solutions should be. Moreover, other solution concepts, such as
backward induction or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, fail to single out these
intuitive solutions. Motivated by these examples, we propose axioms requiring the
players to follow the intuitive solutions in these games. We then organize these
axioms through iterations to define a new solution concept called determinacy.
2.1.1 An outline
We now describe the approach in more detail. We start with the axioms.
Our first axiom refines the usual backward induction. The usual backward
induction solves (i.e., gives a unique prediction) only for the games in “general
position”. That is, the payoffs to each player at different leaves of the game tree
are different. For other games backward induction may fail. We want to refine this
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backward induction algorithm so that it solves those games not in general position
as well.
For an illustration, consider the following two-period game.
Figure 1
(1, 0)






Since player 2’s payoff of choosing L or R in the second period ties (both are 0),
he is indifferent between which one to choose and both are possible. So according
to the usual backward induction in the first period player 1 can choose either L or
R since it is possible that choosing R could also lead to a payoff same as that of
choosing L.
Thus the usual backward induction fails to give an instruction to player 1 as
which one of the two choices to make in the first period. But it is easy to argue
on an intuitive ground that L is a better choice. Suppose R is chosen by player 1,
then in the second period player 2 may choose L so that player 1 loses the game
since player 2 is indifferent between choosing L and R. So player 1 actually cannot
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guarantee a win in the subgame after R is played. But if, instead of playing R in
the first period, he plays L then he is sure to win the game. So playing L gives him
a much more secured winning situation than that of choosing R.
In order to rule out such irrational behaviors as player 1 choosing R in this
game, we propose a refined backward induction as an axiom which, when applied
to this game, requires the player 1 to choose L in the first period.
The following example motivates our second axiom. Two players, 1 and 2, al-
ternate saying “stop” or “continue”, starting with player 1. If either player says
“stop”, the game ends immediately and both get nothing; otherwise the play con-
tinues forever and each player receives one dollar.
(0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)(0, 0)
(1, 1)
player 1 player 2 player 1 player 2
continue continue continue continue
stop stop stop stop
Figure 2
Although any path can be supported by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
the only reasonable one seems to be the path that players always say “continue”.
As long as there are chances for a player to win (to get the payoff of 1), why should
he choose to lose for sure by saying “stop”? Moreover, it is common interest of
both players to always say “continue” since that will give both the payoff of 1. So
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they can win the game by simply not “giving up”.
In order to rule out the irrational moves such as saying “stop” in this game, we
propose a cooperation axiom that requires the players always saying “continue”, if
it is applied to this game.
Our third axiom is a very natural, and even compelling, one. A strategy for a
player is a winning strategy if following it he always wins the game regardless of
how his opponent plays. The last axiom says that if a player has a winning strategy
the he should follow it.
Building on these three axioms we develop the solution concept.
Say that a game is trivial if the players’ payoff functions are constant, taking
the value of either 0 or 1. That is, a player in a trivial game either always wins or
always loses. A trivial game can be regarded as determined since no matter how
the game is played the outcome is fixed and known.
Given an arbitrary game G, the axioms may not be directly applicable to it.
But we can apply the axioms to its subgames. Say we apply an axiom to a subgame
of G starting at a position p. Denote this subgame by Gp. Then by the axiom we
know what the outcome of this subgame Gp should be. Say, the axiom predicts
that it is a game both players lose. We then modify the game G by replacing
the payoff of the subgame Gp by the constant functions taking value 0, i.e., the
payoff functions of a trivial game in which both players lose. That is, we replace
this subgame by a trivial game whose payoffs are that suggested by a behavioral
axiom. So the payoff of G is changed since the payoff of the subgame Gp is changed.
Denote this new game by G1.
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Since G and G1 differ only in the subgame starting at the position p and the
axiom suggests that both subgames have the same outcome. So from the pointview
of the outcomes of games, G and G1 are equivalent. But G1 is simpler since, instead
of having an arbitrary subgame, it has a trivial subgame. Intuitively, the reduction
G→ G1 partially solves G by solving a subgame of G.
We then iterate the reduction G → G1 by applying the axioms to G1 or a
subgame of G1 to get a new game G2. We can continue in this manner to obtain a
chain 〈G,G1, G2, · · · , Gm〉 of games. If at certain stage we reach a game Gn which
is already trivial we then stop. Since the outcome of each Gk is same as that of
Gk+1 by the axioms, by an induction argument we know that the outcome of G is
(the outcome of) this trivial game. In this way we then know what the outcome of
G should be. We say such a game G is determined.
Summing up, a gameG is determined if there exists a reduction chain 〈G,G1, G2, · · · , Gn〉
with Gn trivial and each Gk+1 is obtained from Gk by applying a behavior axiom
to it. Intuitively, a game is determined if it can be “solved” by repeatedly solving
many of its subgames, or, by collecting many partial solutions.
One of our main results is an existence type theorem. Say that a game is a
closed game if the underlying sets for the characteristic payoff functions are closed
sets. The theorem says that all closed games are determined. That is, determinacy
as defined above solves the class of closed games.
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2.1.2 The related literature
One way to put the present work in perspective is to recall the mathematical
literature on the determinacy of win-lose games. For simplicity, call the class of
games considered in this chapter non-zero-sum games. A game is called a win-lose
game if the payoffs of the players always sum up to 1. That is, at any play of the
game, one and only one player wins.
Gale and Stewart (1953) is the first systematic study of win-lose games. A win-
lose game is called determined if one of the players has a winning strategy. Gale and
Stewart (1953) proves the fundamental result that all games with closed or open
payoff sets are determined. They also ask whether all games with Borel payoff
sets are determined. After many years of studies (Wolfe (1955), Davis (1963)),
this was finally confirmed by Martin (1975). The study of determinacy of win-lose
games is also found to be closely related to the foundation of mathematics (see,
e.g., Kanamori (2000)).
Our definition of determinacy extends the definition of determinacy in win-
lose games to general non-zero-sum games. And the main theorem in this chapter
extends that of Gale and Stewart (1953).
A second way to put our work in perspective is to recall the literature on
equilibrium refinements. The aim of the equilibrium refinement program is to
impose further behavioral criteria to reduce the set of Nash equilibrium and/or
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Our work can be considered as a realization of
this program in the case of two-player perfect-information games with characteristic
payoff functions.
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The basic axioms we propose refine subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in some
very special games. Our first axiom refines backward induction, an important
ingredient of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Our second axiom refines subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium directly in a cooperative situation. Repeated applications
of these axioms can be viewed as an iterated refining process. So determinacy is
essentially an iteration of refinements. More formally, we show that the outcome
of a determined game can be supported by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Since the outcome of a determined game is unique, determinacy can be viewed as
a unique refinement of subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
Detailed comparisons of determinacy with other solution concepts for games
with perfect information will be given in Section 2.5.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We give the formal definition of
determinacy and main results in Section 2, postponing the axioms to Section 3. As
an illustration, we prove the determinacy of all finite games of perfect information
in Section 4. We then turn to a discussion of determinacy and the related literature
in Section 5. All of the technical proofs are in Section 6.
2.2 Definitions and Main Result
We record here the notation and convention that will be used throughout the
chapter.
Notation 2.2.1. 1. ω = {0, 1, 2, · · · } denotes the set of natural numbers.
2. Y denotes an arbitrary set with at least two elements. E.g., Y = {0, 1},
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Y = {L,R}, Y = {Continue, Stop}, Y = ω.
3. Y ω denotes the set of all infinite sequences with elements from Y . Elements of
Y ω are denoted by f, g. E.g., Y = {Continue, Stop}, f = (Continue,Continue,Continue, · · · ).
Definition 2.2.2. A game G is a pair 〈A1, A2〉, where A1, A2 ⊆ Y
ω are payoff sets
of player 1 and 2 respectively.
The game G = 〈A1, A2〉 is interpreted as follows. Two players, player 1 and
2, alternate choosing elements from Y starting with player 1. Say player 1 first
chooses y0, then player 2, observing this, chooses y1, player 1, after seeing y1, makes
a second choice y2, etc. The game continues in this way so that an infinite sequence
(y0, y1, · · · ) is specified. Player i, i = 1, 2, wins just in case (y0, y1, · · · ) ∈ Ai.
Convention 2.2.3. If a statement or definition is for each of the two players, we
shall only state it for player 1.
Definition 2.2.4. A game G = 〈A1, A2〉 is called a trivial game if each Ai is either
Y ω or ∅. If G = 〈A1, A2〉 is a trivial game, we say that player i wins G if Ai is Y
ω,
otherwise he loses G.
So there are four trivial games: 〈∅, ∅〉, 〈∅, Y ω〉, 〈Y ω, ∅〉, and 〈Y ω, Y ω〉.
Definition 2.2.5. A reduction chain is a sequence 〈G0, G1, · · · , Gn〉 of games such
that each Gk+1 is obtained from Gk by an application of the behavioral axioms to
be defined in section 2.3.
Definition 2.2.6. A game G = 〈A1, A2〉 is called determined if there exists a
reduction chain 〈G0, G1, · · · , Gn〉 such that G0 = G and Gn is trivial.
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Remark 2.2.7. For a technical reason Definition 2.2.6 is incomplete. But it suffices
for the purpose of exposition of the main ideas. The technically complete version,
which allows the chain to go infinitely long, is Definition 2.6.2 and 2.6.3. They will
not be needed until Section 2.6.
The following theorem says that there is no ambiguity if there are more than
one reductions. That is to say, if a game is determined then the outcome predicted
by determinacy is unique.
Theorem 2.2.8. Let 〈G0, G1, · · · , Gn〉 and 〈H0, H1, · · · , Hm〉 be two reduction
chains for a game G such that G0 = H0 = G and Gn, Hm are trivial. Then
Gn = Hm.
Remark 2.2.9. Another way of viewing this result is that it shows the consistency
of the axiom system, in the sense that it never leads to contradicting conclusions.
Definition 2.2.10. Let G = 〈A1, A2〉 be a determined game with a reduction chain
〈G0, G1, · · · , Gn〉. We say that player i wins the game G if he wins Gn, otherwise
he lose G.
Let Y ω be given the natural product topology with Y discrete, i.e., a basic open
neighborhood is of the form
N(y0,y1,··· ,ym) = {(z0, z1, · · · ) ∈ Y
ω | z0 = y0, · · · , zm = ym},
for each (y0, y1, · · · , ym), where each yk, 0 ≤ k ≤ m, is an element of Y . A set
A ⊂ Y ω is an open set if it is a union of some basic open neighborhoods. A ⊂ Y ω
is said to be closed if its complement, Y ω \ A, is open.
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Definition 2.2.11. A game G = 〈A1, A2〉 is called a closed game if both A1 and
A2 are closed sets.
The following is an existence-type theorem for determinacy.
Theorem 2.2.12. All closed games are determined.
Remark 2.2.13. Another way of viewing this result is that it says that the axiom
system is complete, at least, for the class of closed games.
In Theorem 2.6.6 below, we shall show that the axioms are independent in the
sense that if anyone of them is dropped, there will be a game that the remaining
incomplete system is unable to solve.
Thus, we show that the axioms to be described in the following are consistent,
complete and independent.
2.3 The Axioms
An axiom will have the following general format:
Axiom 2.3.1. A game G = 〈A1, A2〉 satisfying certain conditions can be reduced
to a game G∗ = 〈A∗1, A
∗
2〉.
G∗ will be G with the payoff of a subgame replaced by that of a trivial game.
The axiom works as follows. As illustrated in the introduction, there is a behavioral
assumption instructing how the players should play in this subgame. If we require
the players to follow this assumption then we know what the outcome of this
subgame is. The outcome will be one of the four trivial games. Then G∗ is obtained
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from G by replacing this subgame by that trivial game suggested by the behavioral
assumption. So although each axiom is a statement about reduction of games,
there is actually an underlying behavioral assumption indicating what the rational
players should do in a subgame.
Intuitively, the reduction G → G∗ partially solves the game G by solving a
subgame of G. Technically, G∗ is topologically simpler and closer to a trivial game.
We need some following general definitions before proceeding.
Notation 2.3.2. 1. Y <ω denotes the set of all finite sequences with elements
from Y .
2. An element of Y <ω will be denoted by p. E.g., Y = {0, 1}, p = (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1);
Y = {Continue, Stop}, p = (Continue,Continue, Stop).
3. The empty sequence, denoted by ∅, is in Y <ω. A sequence of length 1,
p = (y0), will be identified with the element y0.
4. Let p = (y0, y1, · · · , yk) ∈ Y
<ω and y ∈ Y , pay denotes (y0, y1, · · · , yk, y).
Definition 2.3.3. Let p = (y0, y1, · · · , yn) ∈ Y
<ω. We say that p is a position for
player 1 to move if n is an odd number or p is the empty sequence.
Definition 2.3.4. Let G = 〈A1, A2〉 be a game and let p = (y0, y1, · · · , yn) ∈ Y
<ω.
The subgame Gp is the remaining game starting from the position p. Formally
Gp = 〈A1,p, A2,p〉, where for each i = 1, 2, Ai,p is defined by for all (z0, z1, · · · ) ∈ Y
ω,
(z0, z1, · · · ) ∈ Ai,p if and only if (y0, y1, · · · , yn, z0, z1, · · · ) ∈ Ai, .
Remark 2.3.5. We have the convention that the player who moves first in a subgame
Gp is the player who moves at p.
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2.3.1 First Axiom
In order to rule out irrational behaviors such as player 1 choosing R in the game
in Example 1, we propose a refined version of backward induction.
We said that L is a better choice than R because choosing L leads to secured
win for player 1; while the win in the subgame following R is not secured in the
sense that whether it leads to a win is completely determined by player 2 who is
indifferent. So it is crucial for us to formally represent the difference between a
secured and an unsecured win. The way we distinguish the secured and unsecured
win is to regard a subgame in which a player is unable to secure a win as a subgame
that he loses.
Let p be a position for player 1 to move. Let G = 〈A1, A2〉 be such that,
for each player i and each y ∈ Y , either Npay ⊂ Ai or Ai ∩ Npay = ∅. Note
that this is equivalent to Ai,pay = Npay or Ai,pay = ∅ using the subgame notion
Gpay = 〈A1,pay, A2,pay〉. I.e., Gpay is a trivial game for each y ∈ Y .
Since it is player 1’s turn to move at p, clearly, he can secure a win in the
subgame Gp if and only if there exists some y such that if he chooses this y, he
for sure wins, i.e., ∃y(Npay ⊂ A1). While for player 2, he can secure a win for the
subgame Gp if and only if the following is true:
1. Suppose player 1 has some choice y such that he wins the subgame Gpay, i.e.,
Npay ⊂ A1. So if there are more than one such y, player 1 could choose any
one. In this case if player 2 want to guarantee a win for Gp he has to be sure
that he wins Gpay for all such y.
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2. Otherwise, for all possible choice y, player 1 will lose the subgame Gpay, i.e.,
Npay ∩ A1 = ∅. So player 1 is indifferent in choosing which y and any y is
possible. In this case if player 2 want to guarantee a win for Gp he has to be
sure that he wins Gpay for all y.
Formally this can be summarized as the following formula
[∃y(Npay ⊂ A1)→ ∀y(Npay ⊂ A1 → Npay ⊂ A2)]
& [∀y(Npay ∩ A1 = ∅)→ ∀y(Npay ⊂ A2)].
(2.1)
If condition (2.1) is violated then player 2 does not have a secured win for the
subgame Gp.
We can now state part of the axiom.
Axiom 2.3.6 (Refined Backward Induction, Case 1). Let G and p be as above.
Then G can be reduced to G∗ = 〈A∗1, A
∗
2〉 where each A
∗
i is defined as follows.
1. A∗1 = A1 ∪Np if ∃y(Npay ⊂ A1) and A
∗
1 = Ai otherwise.
2. A∗2 = A2 ∪Np if condition (2.1) holds, and A
∗
2 = A2 \Np otherwise.
Remark 2.3.7. The implicit behavioral assumption behind item 1 simply says that
in case that player has some choice y at position p which makes him win the
subgame Gp, then he should choose one of such ys to win the game. But there is
no further requirement as which one he should choose.
Item 2 indicates, as we have shown above, when Gp is a secured win for the
inactive player at p.
Now we consider a slightly different situation. Suppose that there is a y such
that player 1 is sure to win the subgame Gpay and player 2 is sure to lose this
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subgame, i.e.
Npay ⊂ A1 and Npay ∩ A2 = ∅. (2.2)
By a similar analysis as above, we can conclude that player 1 will win the game
Gp and “player 2 will lose” since he is not able to secure a win if player 1 chooses
this particular y. Note that in this situation we do not even need to know what
are the outcomes in those subgames Gpay for other ys. Formally,
Axiom 2.3.8 (Refined Backward Induction, Case 2). Let G and p be as above.
Then G = 〈A1, A2〉 can be reduced to 〈A1 ∪Np, A2 \Np〉.
2.3.2 Second Axiom
The way we solve the problem in Example 2 is to introduce a behavioral axiom
requiring the players to cooperate when they have the same payoff sets. For in-
stance, it has to force the players to say “continue” at each stage in this example.
Formally we would require that any game G = 〈A1, A2〉 such that A1 = A2 6= ∅ can
be reduced to a trivial game G∗ = 〈Y ω, Y ω〉. This is the main idea of the axiom.
But it is necessary for us to relax the condition A1 = A2 6= ∅ slightly while still
capturing the same idea. For instance, consider the following variant of Example
2.
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(0, 1) (1, 0)(0, 1)
(1, 1)
player 1 player 2 player 1 player 2
continue continue continue continue
stop stop stop stop
Figure 3
(1, 0)
Although the players have different payoff sets in this game, the same analysis
showing that the rational outcome should be that the players cooperate so that
they both win the game still applies.
If a player says “stop” at any stage, he is sure to lose the game. So suppose
they both avoid the sure-to-lose moves, then they will win the game since then
they can only say “continue” forever. So in this situation rational players should
also cooperate.
Putting the intuitions of these two examples together we have the following
more general behavioral axiom: If, modulo the effect of avoiding the sure-to-lose
moves on the payoff sets, they have essentially the same payoff set, then they should
cooperate to win the game.
Formally, we say that player i is sure to lose after a choice y at position p if
Npay ∩ Ai = ∅, or equivalently, Ai,pay = ∅. So the effect on the payoff sets Ai by
avoiding all the sure-to-moves can be represented by a set
K = {Npay |(1) ∃i(i moves at q) & (2) Gpay is trivial
& (3) Gp is not trivial & (4) Ai,pay = ∅}.
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Define, for each i = 1, 2, A˜i = Ai \K. Then Ai is the new payoff set of player i
if both players avoids sure-to-lose moves.
The axiom states that if
A˜1 = A˜2 6= ∅, (2.3)
i.e., the players have the same payoff functions modulo the irrational moves, then
they should cooperate to win the game. Putting it in our reduction language, we
have
Axiom 2.3.9 (Cooperation Axiom). Suppose (4.1) holds, then G can be reduced
to the trivial game 〈Y ω, Y ω〉.
2.3.3 Third Axiom
Definition 2.3.10. Let M1 ⊂ Y
<ω be the collection of all positions for player 1 to
move. A strategy σ for player 1 is a function from M1 to Y .
Let σ and τ be strategies for player 1 and 2 respectively. A play according to
σ and τ is the sequence
σ ∗ τ =
(
σ(∅), τ(σ(∅)), σ((σ(∅), τ(σ(∅))), · · ·
)
.
Definition 2.3.11. A strategy σ for player 1 is a winning strategy in the game
G = 〈A1, A2〉 if and only if for each strategy τ of player 2, σ ∗ τ ∈ A1.
Axiom 2.3.12. 1. Suppose player 1 has a winning strategy in G = 〈A1, Y
ω〉,
then G can be reduced to 〈Y ω, Y ω〉.
2. Suppose player 1 has a winning strategy in G = 〈A1, ∅〉, then G can be
reduced to 〈Y ω, ∅〉.
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2.4 Determinacy of finite games
This section illustrates the working of determinacy by proving that all finite games
are determined. The following definition gives the usual notion of finite games in
the infinite setting.
Definition 2.4.1. A game G = 〈A1, A2〉 is called finite if there exists a natural
number n such that for each sequence p ∈ Y <ω of length n, either Np ⊂ Ai or
Np ∩ Ai = ∅, for each i = 1, 2. I.e., for each such p, Gp is a trivial game.
Like the usual backward induction, the refined backward induction alone is able
to solve for any finite games.
Theorem 2.4.2. Finite games are determined.
Proof. For simplicity, consider the case Y is a finite set. The general case is left to
Section ??. Let G be a finite game of length n on Y , i.e., Gp is trivial for each p of
length n.
Define a reduction chain 〈Gk | k ≤ m〉 (m to be determined), by induction on
k. Let G0 = G. Suppose Gk−1 has been defined. Pick an element p ∈ Y
<ω such
that Gk−1,p is not trivial and for each y ∈ Y , Gk−1,pay is trivial. So Gk−1 and p
satisfy the conditions for the refined backward induction. Let Gk = G
∗
k−1, where
G∗k−1 is obtained by applying the axiom to Gk−1. If there is no such p, then Gk−1
is already a trivial game, let m = k − 1. By finiteness of Y , the reduction process
terminates at some finite stages. So m exists. Thus we obtain a finite reduction
chain for G and G is determined.
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2.5 Discussion
We now turn to a discussion of determinacy and the axioms.
2.5.1 Interpretation of determinacy
The outcome given by determinacy requires a different interpretation. The reason
is that we use the expression “a player lose a game” not only its literal meaning,
but also as a device to record an unsecured win.
Suppose G reduces to a trivial game G∗ = 〈A∗1, A
∗
2〉. If player i wins the game
G, i.e., A∗i = Y
ω, then indeed player i can win the game if he (or both players)
plays rationally. But if player i loses the game G, i.e., A∗i = ∅, then there are two
possibilities.
The first possibility is that indeed player i is for sure to lose the game G.
The second possibility is that at certain stage of the reduction process the refined
backward induction is applied, and “player i loses the game G” only means that he
has an unsecured win at certain subgame. So in this case it is indeed possible for
player player i to lose in the game G by losing that subgame, but it is also possible
for him to win G. Which case happens will depend entirely on the other player’
choice and, moreover, he is indifferent in which one to choose.
Summing up, “player i wins the game G”, i.e., A∗i = Y
ω, indeed means that
player i can win the game but “player i loses the game G”, i.e., A∗i = ∅, does not
necessarily implies that he will for sure lose the game.
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2.5.2 Comparison with the usual backward induction
To see exactly how the refined backward induction differs from the usual backward
induction let’s define a notation vi(G), where vi(G) = 1 if player i wins G, otherwise
vi(G) = 0. Let p be a position for player 1 to move. The refined backward induction
can be interpreted as the following two equations,
v1(Gp) = max{v1(Gpay) | y ∈ Y }, (2.4)
v2(Gp) = min{v2(Gpay) | y ∈ Y & v1(Gpay) = v1(Gp)}. (2.5)
The usual backward induction also has equation 2.4, but equation 2.5 is weak-
ened to
v2(Gp) ∈ {v2(Gpay) | y ∈ Y & v1(Gpay) = v1(Gp)}. (2.6)
Hence the usual backward induction allows for the value v2(Gp) to be that of
arbitrary subgame Gpay as long as it is possible for player 1 to choose y. But
refined backward induction requires that 2 has to guarantee that he can at least
have v2(Gp), regardless of what player 1 will choose as long as player 1 is rational
and chooses one that gives himself highest possible payoff.
Equation (2.5) and (2.6) coincide in case that G is in general position, so there is
no difference between refined backward induction and the usual backward induction
in this case. But in our context, the games that are in general position, i.e. for
each i there is no more than one y such that Ai,pay = Npay and no more than one
y such that Ai,pay = ∅, are actually not general.
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2.5.3 Comparison with weak dominance
Our second axiom, and some case of the third axioms, can be derived from weak
dominance. But we are still using these axioms rather than weak dominance as the
basic principles for several reasons.
Firstly they are weaker than weak dominance since weak dominance implies
them but certainly they do not imply weak dominance. In setting axiom systems
we always choose the weakest possible ones.
Secondly they are concepts in quite different settings. Weak dominance is a
concept for normal form games and the axioms are designed for applications in
dynamic games with perfect information. In applying weak dominance to them we
are implicitly reducing the dynamic games to one-shot games, losing the important
dynamic character.
Thirdly, the axioms are local, or atomic, statements in the sense that they apply
only to some very special games satisfying certain conditions. But we can try weak
dominance for any games. So weak dominance is a global statement. In setting
axioms, it would be desirable to minimize the domain of application.
Fourthly, and more seriously, when applied to these games weak dominance is
inconsistent with our second axiom. Consider the example in Figure 4.
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Figure 4
(0, 0)






Weak dominance suggest player 1 choosing R in the first period and the payoff
of player 2 in the whole game is 1. Following the same analysis that leads to the
refined backward induction, it seems too strong to come to this conclusion: It is
possible for player 2 in the second period to choose L, hence it is possible for player
1 to lose by choosing R. Basing on this, player 1 can choose L in the first period
so that the payoff of player 2 is 0.
Formally, our second axiom does not imply that the payoff of player 2 in this
game must for sure be 1. This contradicts weak dominance.
2.5.4 Comparison with subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
We have already seen that each axiom is actually a unique refinement of subgame
perfect Nash equilibria in some special games. I.e, the axioms refine subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium at the local level. The following theorem shows the out-
come of a determined game is supported by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Namely, determinacy is a refinement of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when
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looked globally.
Definition 2.5.1. G is called strictly determined if Gp is determined for each
p ∈ Y <ω.
Theorem 2.5.2. Let G = 〈A1, A2〉 be strictly determined. Then there exist strate-
gies σ and τ , for player 1 and 2 respectively, such that
1. (σ, τ) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and
2. σ ∗ τ ∈ Ai if and only if player i wins the game, i = 1, 2.
Remark 2.5.3. An implication of determinacy for the refinement literature is the fol-
lowing. In refining solution concepts we should focus on the uniqueness of outcome
rather than on the strategy profiles. For example, in a trivial game any strategy
is as good as the others, either in the sense of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
or in the sense of any possible future refinements. But the outcome of the game,
whether a player is going to win or lose the game, is uniquely determined. As long
as different sets of strategies give the same result as suggested by determinacy, it
seems that there is no point to further distinguish them.
2.5.5 Conclusion
By iterating three simple behavioral axioms we build a new solution concept for
the class of two-person perfect information games with characteristic payoff func-
tions. These axioms are shown consistent, complete and independent. Moreover, it
determines a unique vector of payoffs that corresponds to a subgame perfect Nash
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equilibrium. Thus it can be viewed as a unique refinement of subgame perfect Nash
equilibria.
2.6 Proofs
2.6.1 Ordinals and the complete version of determinacy
The ordinal numbers were Georg Cantor’s deepest contribution to mathematics.
After the natural numbers 0, 1, ... n, ... comes the first infinite ordinal number ω,
followed by ω + 1, ω + 2, ... , ω + ω, . . . and so forth. ω is the first limit ordinal
as it is neither 0 nor a successor ordinal. We follow the von Neumann convention,
according to which each ordinal number α is identified with the set {ν|ν < α} of its
predecessors. The ∈ relation on ordinals thus coincides with <. We have 0 = ∅ and
α+ 1 = α ∪ {α}. In particular, ω = {0, 1, 2, · · · } is the set of all natural numbers.
Thus we arrive at the following picture
0, 1, · · · , n, · · · , ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, · · · , ω + ω, · · · , ω2, · · · .
The version of determinacy we gave in Definition 2.2.6 is inadequate since there
are games in which we need more than finite steps of reduction in order to have
a trivial game. For instance, in Theorem 2.4.2, if the choice set Y is infinite,
say Y = ω, then Definition 2.2.6 does not work since, no matter how long the
reduction chain is, a finite chain is not able to solve an infinite number of subgames
{Gpay|y ∈ ω}. For instance, we need to apply the refined backward induction
axiom for each subgame Gpan, n ∈ ω. Then at least we need an infinite chain
〈G0, G1, G2, · · · 〉 each reduction Gk → Gk+1 solving the subgame Gpak. So we
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need to allow for arbitrarily infinitely long reduction chains in the definition of
determinacy. The notion of ordinals is a nice tool for this purpose. In the following,
Greek letters α, β, γ, δ denote general ordinals numbers, θ denotes a limit ordinal.
We shall use intensively the techniques of definition and proof by induction
on ordinals. They are natural extensions of definition and proof by induction on
natural numbers since ordinals are just extensions of natural numbers.
For example, if we need to define a sequence of subsets of Y ω, 〈Aα | α < γ〉,
it suffices to proceed as follows. First define what A0 is. Given that α is defined,
proceed to define α+1. If θ < γ is a limit ordinal and given that Aα is defined for
each α < θ, describe how Aθ is defined.
Suppose we are to prove a proposition P (α) with an ordinal α is involved. We
proceed similarly by proving the base case P (0); given the induction hypothesis
P (α), prove P (α + 1); and given the induction hypothesis P (α) for each α < θ,
where θ is a limit ordinal, prove P (θ).
Definition 2.6.1. Let θ be a limit ordinal and let 〈Aα | α < θ〉 be a sequence of
subsets of Y ω. Then Aθ = lim
α<θ
Aα is defined by letting, for all f ∈ Y
ω, f ∈ Aθ if
and only if there exists β < θ such that f ∈ Aα for all α > β. I.e., an element f
is in the limit Aθ if and only if it is in Aα for all but a bounded initial segment of
〈Aα | α < θ〉.
Definition 2.6.2. A reduction chain is a sequence 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α 6 γ〉 of
games such that eachGα+1 is obtained fromGα by applications of the behavioral ax-





The following is the complete version of the definition of determinacy.
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Definition 2.6.3. A game G = 〈A1, A2〉 is called determined if there exists a
reduction chain 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α 6 γ〉 such that G0 = G and Gγ is trivial.
The following are the corresponding versions for Theorem 2.6.33 and Definition
2.2.10.
Theorem 2.6.4. Let 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α 6 γ〉 and 〈Hα = 〈B1,α, B2,α〉 | α 6 δ〉
be two reduction chains for the game G = 〈A1, A2〉 such that G0 = H0 = G and
Gγ, Hδ are trivial. Then Gγ = Hδ.
Definition 2.6.5. Let G = 〈A1, A2〉 be a determined game with a reduction chain
〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α 6 γ〉. We say that player i wins the game G if he wins Gγ,
otherwise he lose G.
The last theorem says that the axioms are independent.
Theorem 2.6.6. If any of the following items are dropped then there will be a
closed game that is not determined:
Case 1 of refined backward induction; Case 2 of refined backward induction;
The cooperation axiom; Case 1 of the third axiom; Case 2 of the third axiom.
2.6.2 Preliminaries
Before proceeding we need to establish some preliminary results in this section.
Notation 2.6.7. Let f = (y0, y1, · · · ) ∈ Y
ω and k ≥ 1, f ↾ k denotes (y0, y1, · · · , yk−1).
Similarly, let p = (y0, y1, · · · , yn) ∈ Y
<ω and k ≤ n + 1, then p ↾ k denotes
(y0, y1, · · · , yk−1).
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Definition 2.6.8. Let f, fn ∈ Y
ω, n ≥ 0. Say that the sequence fn converges to
f , written as fn → f or lim
n→∞
fn = f , if there exist a nondecreasing sequence of
natural numbers 〈kn | n ≥ 0〉 such that kn →∞ and fn ↾ kn = f ↾ kn for each n.
Lemma 2.6.9. Let A be a subset of Y ω. A is closed if and only if for each sequence
〈fn | n ≥ 0〉 such that for each n, fn ∈ A and fn → f , then f ∈ A.
Proof. ( =⇒ ) Assume, towards a contradiction, f ∈ Y ω \A. Since Y ω \A is open,
by definition, it’s a union of basic open neighborhoods Np for some p ∈ Y
<ω. So
there is a particular p such that f ∈ Np. Let k be the length of p, then f ↾ k = p.
So for all n > n0, where n0 is the least integer such that kn0 > k, fn ↾ k = f ↾ k = p.
It follows that fn ∈ Np ⊂ (Y
ω \A) for all n > n0, contradicting the fact that fn ∈ A
for all n. Therefore f ∈ A.
(⇐=) It suffices to show that Y ω \A is open, i.e., Y ω \A is a union of basic open
neighborhoods of the form Np. That is, each f ∈ Y
ω \A sits in Nf↾k ⊂ Y
ω \A for
some k. Take an arbitrary f ∈ Y ω \A. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that for
all k ≥ 0, Nf↾k * Y
ω \ A. Then, for each k, there is a gk ∈ Nf↾k and gk /∈ Y
ω \ A.
Equivalently, for each k, g ↾ k = f ↾ k and gk ∈ A. So gk → f . By assumption,
f ∈ A, a contradiction. So Y ω \ A is open and A is closed.
Lemma 2.6.10. Let 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α < θ〉 be a reduction chain such that θ
is a limit ordinal. Then for each f ∈ Y ω and each i there exists β < θ such that
either f ∈ Ai,α for all α > β or f /∈ Ai,α for all α > β.
Proof. Fix i and an f . Since f will be removed from or added to the payoff set of
i only if an axiom is applied to a subgame Gf↾k for some natural number k ≥ 0.
By this can happen only with a finite sequence of k1 > k2 > · · · > kn ≥ 0.
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Lemma 2.6.11. Let 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α ≤ γ〉 be a reduction chain such that
G0 is a closed game, then each Gα, α ≤ γ, is also a closed game.
Proof. Fix i. We proceed by induction on α ≤ γ to show each Ai,α is closed.
Ai,0 is closed by assumption.
Suppose Ai,α is closed. Ai,α+1 is either Ai,α, Ai,α ∪Np or Ai,α \Np for some p,
so Ai,α+1 is closed.
Let θ be a limit ordinal and each Ai,α, α < θ, is closed. Suppose that fn ∈
Ai,θ = lim
α<θ
Ai,α for each n = 1, 2, · · · , and lim
n→∞
fn = f , we want to show that
f ∈ Ai,θ.
From the definition of lim
α<θ
Ai,θ, let βn be the least ordinal such that fn ∈ Ai,α
for each α > βn. By choosing a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that
β1 ≤ β2 ≤ · · · and fn ↾ n = f ↾ n.
Either there exists some n0 such that βn0 = βn0+1 = βn0+2 = · · · or there is a
subsequence 〈βnk | k ≥ 1〉 of 〈βn | n ≥ 1〉 such that βn1 < βn2 < βn3 < · · · .
Case 1. fn ∈ Ai,α for all n ≥ 0 and all α > β0. By the induction hypothesis,
i.e., each Ai,α, α < θ, is closed, we have f ∈ Ai,α for each α > β0. So f ∈ Ai,θ.
Case 2. Without lost of generality, let β1 < β2 < β3 < · · · .
We first show that f ∈ Ai,0. For each n, if fn ∈ Ai,0, let gn = fn. Otherwise fn is
added to Ai,βn+1 by letting Ai,βn+1 = Ai,βn ∪Nfn↾kn for some kn. Recall that this is
the case if and only if i wins the subgame Gβn,fn↾kn . In particular, initially A0,i,fn↾kn
cannot be empty. Pick a gn ∈ A0,i ∩ Nfn↾kn. Again by choosing a subsequence if





fn = f . By closedness of A0,i, f ∈ A0,i.
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We next show that f ∈ Ai,α for all but a bounded initial segment of 〈0, 1, · · · , θ〉.
Otherwise, since the status of whether or not f ∈ Ai,α is going to change at most
finitely many times by Lemma 2.6.10, let β be the last ordinal such that f ∈ Ai,β.
Such β exists since f ∈ Ai,0. Then by definition of Ai,β+1 we must have that Ai,β+1
is obtained by Ai,β+1 = Ai,β \ Nf↾l for some l. This contradicts the assumption
that i wins the subgame Gfn↾kn for infinitely many n > l. So f ∈ Ai,α for all but a
bounded initial segment of α < θ, hence f ∈ Ai,θ. So Ai,θ is closed.
This completes the induction.
Lemma 2.6.12. For each G there exists an ordinal γ such that there is no reduction
chain for G of length greater than γ. Formally let 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α ≤ δ〉 be
a reduction chain for G such that for each α ≤ δ, Gα 6= Gα+1 (i.e., no trivial
application of the axioms). Then δ < γ.
Remark 2.6.13. Lemma 2.6.12 implies that if we can define a reduction chain 〈Gα =
〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α ≤ δ〉 such that for each α, if Gα is not trivial then Gα 6= Gα+1.
Then at certain stage γ, Gγ must be trivial. That is, a reduction chain cannot be
arbitrarily long and must terminate at some stage.
Proof of Lemma 2.6.12. Bounded by the cardinality of Y <ω.
Definition 2.6.14. A set T ⊂ Y <ω is called a tree if (y0, y1, · · · , ym) ∈ T , m ≥ 1,
implies (y0, y1, · · · , ym−1) ∈ T .
Definition 2.6.15. A tree T is called well-founded if for all f ∈ Y ω there exists k
such that (f ↾ k) /∈ T .
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Definition 2.6.16. Associate to each closed set A ⊂ Y ω a tree T as follows: p ∈ T
if and only if there exists f ∈ A and k ≥ 0 such that p = f ↾ k. T is called the tree
representation of A.
Remark 2.6.17. By Lemma 2.6.9, if f ↾ k ∈ T for each k ≥ 0, then indeed f ∈ A.
Definition 2.6.18. A t-strategy σ for player 1 is the smallest subset of Y <ω such
that,
1. ∅ ∈ σ.
2. If p = (y0, y1, · · · , yn) ∈ σ and p is a position for player 1 to move, then there
exists a unique y ∈ Y such that pay ∈ σ.
3. If p = (y0, y1, · · · , yn) ∈ σ and p is not a position for player 1 to move, then,
for all y ∈ Y , pay ∈ σ.
Definition 2.6.19. A t-strategy σ for player 1 is a winning t-strategy in the game
G = 〈A1, A2〉 if and only if for all f ∈ Y
ω, (f ↾ n) ∈ σ for each n implies f ∈ A1.
Lemma 2.6.20. Player 1 has a winning strategy in a game G if and only if he has
a winning t-strategy.
Proof. clear.
The following lemma complements Axiom 2.3.12.
Lemma 2.6.21. Suppose player 1 does not have a winning strategy in G = 〈A1, Y
ω〉,
where A1 is a closed set, then G can be reduced to 〈∅, Y
ω〉.
Suppose player 1 does not have a winning strategy in G = 〈A1, ∅〉, where A1 is
a closed set, then G can be reduced to 〈∅, ∅〉.
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Proof. We shall only show the first case, the proof for the second case is similar.
Define a reduction chain 〈Gα = 〈Bα, Y
ω〉 | α ≤ γ〉 such that if player 1 has a
winning strategy in Gα for some α, then it has a winning strategy for G.
Let B0 = A1. Suppose that Bα is defined and player 1 does not have a winning
strategy in Gα. If Bα = Tα = ∅, then let γ = α and we are done.
Otherwise, by Lemma 2.6.11, Bα is closed and nonempty. Let Tα be the tree
representing Bα. By the assumption that 1 does not have a winning strategy and
Lemma 2.6.20, Tα dose not contain a t-strategy.
Hence, by the definition of a t-strategy (Definition 2.6.18), there are two possi-
bilities.
1. there exists some p ∈ Tα of even length k, i.e., p is a position for player 1 to
move, such that for all y ∈ Y , (pay) /∈ Tα. That is, Npay ∩ Bα = ∅ for each
y ∈ Y .
2. there exists some p ∈ Tα of odd length k, i.e., p is a position for player 2 to
move, such that for some y ∈ Y , (pay) /∈ Tα. That is, Npay ∩Bα = ∅ for this
y.
In either case, the refined backward induction applies. Pick one such p and let
Bα+1 = Bα \Np↾(k−1).
If θ is a limit, let Bθ = lim
α<θ
Bα.
Since Bα ) Bα+1 and player does not have a winning strategy in Gα, player
1 cannot have a winning strategy for Gα+1. Similarly player 1 does not have a
winning strategy in Gθ for θ a limit ordinal.
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So 〈Gα = 〈Bα, Y
ω〉 | α ≤ γ〉 defines a reduction chain with G0 = G and
Gγ = 〈∅, Y
ω〉 and the lemma is proved.
Combining Axiom 2.3.12 and Lemma 2.6.21 we have
Lemma 2.6.22. Suppose A1 is a closed set then G = 〈A1, Y
ω〉 can be reduced to
〈A∗1, Y
ω〉, where A∗1 = Y
ω or ∅ according to whether or not player 1 has a winning
strategy.




ω or ∅ according to whether or not player 1 has a winning strategy.
The following lemma is also useful in the following discussion.
Lemma 2.6.23. Let 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α ≤ γ〉 be a sequence of games such that
1. For each α < γ there exists a reduction chain 〈Hβ,γα = 〈B1,β,γα , B2,β,γα〉 | β ≤
γα〉 such that H0,γα = Gα, Hγα,γα = Gα+1;





Then there exists a reduction chain starting with G0 and ending with Gγ.
Proof. Order the set of pairs P = {〈β, γα〉 | β ≤ γα ≤ γ} by 〈β1, γα1〉 < 〈β2, γα2〉 if
γα1 < γα2 or, γα1 = γα2 and β1 < β2. It is easy to see that < is a well ordering of P .
Let δ be the order type of P and pi : P → δ be the canonical order isomorphism. Let
Iξ = Hpi−1(ξ), then the sequence 〈Iξ | ξ < δ〉 forms a reduction chain as required.
2.6.3 Proof of Theorem 2.2.12
Proof. We proceed in two steps.
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Step 1. Define a sequence of games 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α ≤ γ〉, γ to be
determined, inductively.
Let Ai,0 = Ai for each i.
Suppose that Ai,α has been defined, we proceed to define Ai,α+1 for each i.
For any f ∈ (A1,α\A2,α)∪(A2,α\A1,α), say f ∈ A1,α and f /∈ A2,α. By closedness
of A2,α there exists a least k such that Nf↾k ∩ A2,α = ∅, or, A2,α,f↾k = ∅. Consider
the subgame of Gα starting at f ↾ k, Gα,f↾k. Since player 2 has empty payoff set
in this subgame, by Lemma 2.6.22 we know that this subgame is determined. Let
l be the player who moves at the position f ↾ (k − 1). Then either l wins Gα,f↾k,
which will be called case 1, or l loses Gα,f↾k, called case 2.
If there does not exist f satisfying the condition of case 1, we are done. Let
γ = α.
Otherwise pick a pair 〈f, k〉 such that
1. f and k satisfy the condition of case 1. I.e., say, f ∈ A1,α and Nf↾k∩A2,α = ∅
and l wins Gα,f↾(k−1); l is the player that moves at f ↾ (k − 1) and (3− l) is
the inactive player.
2. k is smallest possible among all such pairs 〈f ′, k′〉.
Let Al,α+1 = Al,α ∪ Nf↾(k−1) and A(3−l),α+1 = A(3−l),α \ Nf↾(k−1). (If l wins
Gα,f↾k, so it is not the case that Al,α ∩ Nf↾k = ∅. Then, by the definition of f ,
it must be that A(3−l),α ∩ Nf↾k = ∅. Hence (3 − l) must lose the game Gf↾k. So
A(3−l),α+1 = A(3−l),α \Nf↾(k−1) according to case 2 of refined backward induction.)
According to Lemma 2.6.22 and case 2 of refined backward induction, there exists
a reduction chain linking Gα and Gα+1.
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If θ is a limit ordinal, let Ai,θ = lim
α<θ
Ai,α.
Clearly the procedure terminates at certain stage and γ exists. By Lemma
2.6.23, there is a reduction chain linking G and Gγ .
Step 2. Show that Gγ is determined.
Since f of case 1 does not exist for Gγ, A˜1,γ = A˜2,γ = A1,γ ∩ A2,γ . Here each
A˜i,γ is defined as in equation 4.1. There are two possibilities.
If A1,γ ∩ A2,γ 6= ∅, by the cooperation axiom, Gγ is determined.
Now assume that A1,γ ∩A2,γ = ∅, we will show that Gγ is determined.
Let T be the collection of all those finite sequences of the form f ↾ m, m 6 k,
where f and k are those defined in case 2, with no other k′ < k such that f, k′ also
satisfies that.
Let T0 be the collection of all those pairs 〈f, k〉 such that
1. f and k satisfy the condition of case 2 of Gf↾k. I.e., say, f ∈ A1,α and
Nf↾k ∩A2,α = ∅ and l loses Gα,f↾(k−1); l is the player that moves at f ↾ (k−1)
and (3− l) is the inactive player.
2. k is smallest possible among all such pairs 〈f ′, k′〉.
Let T = {p | ∃〈f, k〉 ∈ T0, ∃m ≤ k such that p = f ↾ m}.
Claim 2.6.24. T is well-founded.
An induction on the well-founded tree T with each induction step applying case
1 of refined backward induction will give us the determinacy of Gγ.
Formally, we will define a reduction chain 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | γ ≤ α ≤ δ〉 as
follows.
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Let Gβ , β ≥ γ, be defined. Search for a p ∈ T such that for all y ∈ Y , Gβ,pay
is trivial but not Gβ,p. Apply refined backward induction to Gβ to get Gβ+1.
Claim 2.6.25. If Gβ is not trivial, such p exists.
If θ > γ is a limit ordinal, let Gθ = lim
β<θ
Gβ.
Let δ be the least ordinal such thatGδ is trivial. So the chain 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 |
γ ≤ α ≤ δ〉 a reduction chain for Gγ and Gγ is determined.
Proof of Claim 2.6.24. Suppose not, then there exists f and a strictly increasing
sequence of natural numbers 〈kn | n ≥ 0〉 such that for all n, (f ↾ kn) ∈ T .
We shall show that f ∈ Ai,γ for each i = 1, 2, contradicting our assumption
that A1,γ ∩ A2,γ = ∅.
First suppose f /∈ Ai,γ for each i = 1, 2. By closedness of each Ai,γ , there exists
k such that Nf↾k ∩ Ai,γ = ∅ for each i. Take an kn > k. By definition of (f ↾ kn)
being in T , there must be a g and an s ≥ kn such that g ↾ kn = f ↾ kn and
〈g, s〉 ∈ T0. In particular, g ∈ Ai,γ for some i. So g ∈ Ai,γ ∩Nf↾k, a contradiction.
So f ∈ Ai,γ for at least one i.
Say, f ∈ A1,γ. Suppose that f /∈ A2,γ. Again by closedness of A2,γ , choose a
least k such that Nf↾k ∩A2,γ = ∅. By the definition of Gγ, f ↾ (k− 1) is a position
for a player that loses Gf↾k to move. For f ↾ kn to be in T , there must be a g and
an s ≥ kn > k such that g ↾ kn = f ↾ kn and 〈g, s〉 ∈ T0. But this is impossible
since 〈g, k〉 satisfies the same conditions that 〈g, s〉 satisfies and k < s.
This shows a contradiction and establishes that T is well-founded.
Proof of Claim 2.6.25. Suppose not, then there is a y0 ∈ T such that Gβ,y0 is not
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trivial. Otherwise, Gβ is trivial. Similarly there is a y1 such that (y0, y1) ∈ T
and Gβ,(y0,y1) is not trivial. Continue in this way we get an infinite sequence f =
(y0, y1, · · · ) such that Gβ,f↾k is not trivial and (f ↾ k) ∈ T for each k ≥ 0. This
contradicts the well-foundedness of T .
This finishes the proof of the main theorem.
2.6.4 Proof of Theorem 2.6.33
Definition 2.6.26. Let p, q ∈ Y <ω be two positions. Say that p extends q if there
exist a natural number k strictly less than the length of q such that q = p ↾ k.
Definition 2.6.27. Two positions p, q ∈ Y <ω are compatible if p extends q or q
extends p or p = q. Otherwise p and q are incompatible.
Let T ⊂ Y ω be a set of positions. Say that p is incompatible with T if p is
incompatible with any q ∈ T . Say that T is a set of incompatible positions if p is
incompatible with T \ {p} for any p ∈ T .
Lemma 2.6.28. Let 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α 6 γ〉 be a reduction chain. Let T ⊂ Y
ω
be a set of incompatible positions such that for each p ∈ T there exists a least ordinal
αp such that Gα,p is trivial. Then there exists a reduction chain 〈Hα | α 6 δ〉 such
that Hδ = Gγ and H0 is defined by
1. H0,p = Gαp,p for each p ∈ T ;
2. H0,p = Gp for p ∈ Y
<ω incompatible with T .
Proof. For each α ≤ γ, let Tα = {p ∈ T | αp > α}. So Tα records those subgames
Gp of G with p ∈ T that haven’t become trivial before α.
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2,α〉 as follows. For each
p ∈ Tα, let G
′
α,p = Gαp,p; for q ∈ Y
<ω incompatible with Tα, let G
′
α,p = Gα,p.




2,α〉 | α 6 γ〉. Note that this may
not be a reduction chain since it may have repeated terms.
We then delete those repeated terms.
Let H0 = G
′
0.
Suppose Hα is defined and Hα = G
′
α′ for some α
′ ≤ γ, let Hα+1 to be G
′
(α+1)′
where (α + 1)′ is the least ordinal > α′ such that G′(α+1)′ 6= Hα.
If such β does not exist, we stop and let δ = α.
If θ is a limit ordinal, let Hθ = lim
α<θ
Hα. Let θ












This completes the inductive construction.
We show next that 〈Hα | α 6 δ〉 is the required reduction chain such that
Hδ = Gγ.
By the definitions of H0 and Hδ, they are the required games. So we only
need to show that it is a reduction chain. Clearly the definition in the limit stages





′ is the least ordinal > α′ such that G′(α+1)′ 6= Hα.
G′(α+1)′ is an application of an axiom to G
′
(α+1)′−1, which is either G
′
α′ = Hα or
same as G′α′ = Hα by definition. So Hα+1 is obtained by an application of the same
axiom to Hα.
Lemma 2.6.29. Suppose that G = 〈A1, A2〉 can be reduced to G1 by applying an
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axiom, say Axiom I, at the position ∅. Let H be obtained G by applying Axiom II
(possibly same as Axiom I) to a position p 6= ∅. Then G1 can also be obtained from
H by applying Axiom I to the position ∅.
Proof. We show this case by case.
Case 1. Axiom I is case 1 of refined backward induction. This is impossible
since it requires that Gp is already trivial.
Case 2. Axiom I is case 2 of refined backward induction. So there is a y such
that that Gy = 〈Ny, ∅〉. But Gp is not trivial, so y 6= p ↾ 1. So the axiom is still
applicable to H since Hy = Gy.
Case 3. Axiom I is cooperation axiom.
Since Gp is not trivial A˜1,p = A˜1,p = Np ∩ A˜1.
Subcase 1. Np ∩ A˜1 = Np ∩ A˜2 6= ∅. Then A˜1,p = A˜1,p = Np ∩ A˜1 6= ∅.
Cooperation axiom is applicable to the subgame Gp also. If Axiom II is not the
cooperation axiom, by Lemma 2.6.28, it gives the same result as the cooperation
axiom. So we assume that Axiom II is the cooperation axiom. So Hp = 〈Np, Np〉
and B˜1 = B˜2 = A˜1 ∪Np 6= ∅. So Axiom I, the cooperation axiom, is applicable to
H .
Subcase 2. Np ∩ A˜1 = Np ∩ A˜2 = ∅. That is Np ∩ (A1 \K) = Np ∩ (A2 \K) =
(Np∩A1)\ (Np∩K) = (Np∩A2)\ (Np∩K) = ∅. So A1,p∪A2,p ⊂ K. (K is defined
in equation 4.1.) We show case by case that this is impossible.
Axiom II cannot be case 2 of refined backward induction since that would
require there exists a y such that the player that moves at this position, say player
1, wins the subgame at pay. I.e., Npay ⊂ A1 and p is a position of player 1. This
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contradicts A1,p ⊂ K.
Axiom II cannot be the cooperation axiom. This is obvious since A˜1,γ,p =
A˜2,γ,p = ∅.
Axiom II is case 1 of refined backward induction, say player 1 moves at p. For
refined backward induction to be applicable, it must be true that for all y, Gpay is
trivial.
For A˜1 ∩Np = ∅, it must be true that for all y, A1,pay = ∅. Otherwise for some
y, A1,pay = Npay, since Gpay is trivial, either A2,pay = Npay or A2,pay = ∅. So
A˜1,p = Npay since Gp is not trivial, a contradiction.
Since Gp is not trivial there is a y
′ such that A2,pay′ = Npay′ and a y
′′ such
that A2,pay′′ = ∅. So applying the axiom to Gp we have Hp = 〈∅, ∅〉. Then
B˜1 = B˜2 = A˜1 = A˜2 6= ∅. So the the cooperation axiom still applies to H .
Axiom II cannot be case 1 of the third axiom. Otherwise player 1 has a winning
strategy, say σ is a t-strategy for player 1 in the subgame Gp. Take any f such
that f ↾ k ∈ σ for each k ≥ the length of p. Since σ is a winning t-strategy f ∈ A1.
For A˜1 ∩Np = ∅, then there has to be a k such that f ↾ k is a position for player 2
to move and Nf↾(k+1) ⊂ K.
We claim that there exists a particular f and a k such that f ↾ k is a position for
player 2 to move and N(f↾k)ay ⊂ K for each y. I.e., N(f↾k)ay ∩A2 = ∅. Since (f ↾ k)
is a position for player 2 to move and σ is a winning t-strategy, N(f↾k)ay ⊂ A1. So
Gf↾k is trivial, this contradicts the requirement for N(f↾k)ay ⊂ K.
We now show the claim. We assume, towards a contradiction, that for each
such f and k there is a y such that N(f↾k)ay * K, i.e., A1,(f↾k)ay 6= N(f↾k)ay.
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Start from p0 = p. p0 is a position for player 1 to move, so there exists y0
such that p0
ay0 ∈ σ. Let p1 = p0
ay0. By assumption there exists a y1 such
that A1,p1ay1 6= Np1ay1. Let p2 = p1




a · · · . Then for all k such that g ↾ k is a position for player 2 to move and
A1,g↾(k+1) is not trivial. So Ng↾(k+1) * K, a contradiction.
Axiom II cannot be case 2 of the third axiom. Otherwise player 1 has a winning
strategy, in particular A1 is not empty. Let f ∈ A1, then f ∈ A2 = Y
ω. Then
f ∈ A˜1 since for f to be inK there has to be a k and an i such thatNf↾k∩Ai = ∅, but
f ∈ Nf↾k ∩Ai, which is a contradiction. Therefore f ∈ A˜1 contradicts A˜1∩Np = ∅.
Case 4. Axiom I is case 1 of the third axiom, say player 1 has a winning strategy.
So A2 = ∅.
Subcase 1. Suppose player 1 has a t-strategy σ such that p ∈ σ, then σp = {q ∈
σ | q extends p or q = p} is a winning strategy for player 1 in the subgame Gp. So
Gp is subgame case 1 of the third axiom is applicable. By Lemma 2.6.28, Axiom
II applied to the subgame Gp gives the same result as that given by case 1 of the
third axiom, if Axiom II is not case 1 of the third axiom. So Hp = 〈Np, ∅〉 and σ
is still a winning strategy for Hp.
Subcase 2. Suppose player 1 has a t-strategy σ such that p /∈ σ, then σ is also
a t-strategy for Hp.
Case 5. Axiom I is case 2 of the third axiom. Similar argument as in case 4
works.
Lemma 2.6.30. Suppose that 〈Gα | α ≤ γ〉 is a reduction chain and at each
successor step Gα+1 is obtained from Gα by applying an axiom to a position qα.
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Suppose further that qα extends a position p for all α < γ, i.e., for all α < γ, Gα+1
are obtained from Gα by applying an axiom to a subgame of Gα,p.
Suppose that G can also be reduced to H by applying an axiom, say Axiom I,
at the position p. Then Axiom I can also be applied to Gγ to get H.
Suppose that Gγ is trivial, then Gγ = H.
Proof. We show by induction on α ≤ γ that Axiom I is applicable to Gα. In
particular, if Gγ is trivial, then Axiom I is still applicable to Gγ, which implies
Gγ = H .
By assumption Axiom I is applicable to G0 = G.
Suppose that Axiom I is applicable to Gα. Since Gα+1 is obtained from Gα by
applying an axiom to a subgame, say Gα,q, where q extends p, of Gα,p. So Lemma
2.6.29 says that Axiom I is still applicable to Gα+1.
Suppose θ is a limit ordinal. We then proceed case by case on Axiom I.
Case 1. Axiom I cannot be case 1 of refined backward induction since this
requires Gpay for each y is already.
Case 2. Axiom I is case 2 of refined backward induction. Since this requires
G0,pay for some y and this still holds for Gθ,pay, Axiom I is applicable to Gθ.
Case 3. Axiom I is the cooperation axiom.
Reexamining case 3 of the proof of Lemma 2.6.29 we can see that, for each qα,
there are two possibilities: if A˜1,α ∩ Nqα 6= ∅, then Ai,α+1 = Ai,α ∪ Nqα for each i;
otherwise only case 1 of refined backward induction applies and Ai,α+1 = Ai,α \Nqα
for each i.
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Now compare Ai with Ai,θ. First let
T = {qα | ∀β < θ, β 6= α(qβ extends qα or qβ is incompatible with qα)}.
Define
R = {Nqα | qα ∈ T & A˜1,α ∩Nqα 6= ∅},
and
S = {Nqα | qα ∈ T & A˜1,α ∩Nqα = ∅}.
Then Ai,θ = (Ai ∪ R) \ S.
Let Kα be the K defined in Equation () for the game Gα. Now compare K0
with Kθ. By definition, we have
K0 = {Nqay |∃i(i moves at q) & G0,qay is trivial
& G0,q is not trivial & Ai,0,q = ∅}.
Kθ = {Nqay |∃i(i moves at q) & Gθ,qay is trivial
& Gθ,q is not trivial & Ai,θ,q = ∅}.
Kθ = (Kθ \K0) ∪ (K0 ∩Kθ).
First consider each Nqay ⊂ (Kθ \ K0). There are two reasons that Nqay is in
Kθ but not in K0: at a stage, say α, Gα,qay become trivial, or Ai,α,qay = ∅, and
Gθ,qay = Gα,qay. Note this can happen only when there is a subgame of Gα,qay
become trivial at a successor stage (β+1) ≤ α. The condition that qβ, qβ extending
qay, satisfies must be the case that A˜1,β∩Nqβ 6= ∅, hence case 1 of refined backward
induction applies and Ai,β+1 = Ai,β \ Nqβ for each i. So Gβ+1,qβ = 〈∅, ∅〉. Gβ+1,qβ
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being a subgame of Gqay and Gα,qay is trivial implies that Gθ,qay = Gα,qay = 〈∅, ∅〉.
So (Kθ \K) ∩Ai,θ = ∅ for each i. Therefore
(Kθ \K)
c ∩ Ai,θ = Ai,θ. (2.7)
Next we consider each Nqay ⊂ (K0\Kθ). Note that once G0,qay become trivial it
has to be trivial forever. So there are two reasons that Nqay is in K0 but not in Kθ:
at a stage, say α, Gα,q become trivial, or Ai,α,qay = Nqay, and Gθ,qay = Gα,qay. For
this to happen, by case 3 of the proof of Lemma 2.6.29, there are two possibilities:
Subcase 1. Gα,q become trivial through applications of case 1 of refined back-
ward induction. So Gα,q = 〈∅, ∅〉. Therefore Nqay ⊂ S.
Subcase 2. α = β+1 is a successor ordinal and Gα,q become trivial or Ai,α,qay =
Nqay because of an application of the cooperation axiom to qβ , q
ay extending qβ.
So Gα,qβ = 〈Npβ , Npβ〉 and Gα,q = 〈Np, Np〉. Therefore Nqay ⊂ R.
So we have (K0 \Kθ) ⊂ (R∪S). It follows that (K0 \Kθ) = (R∪S)∩ (K0 \Kθ)
and Sc ∩ (K0 \Kθ) = S
c ∩ (R ∪ S) ∩ (K0 \Kθ) = R ∩ S
c ∩ (K0 \Kθ). Therefore
Ai ∩ S
c ∩ (K0 \Kθ) = Ai ∩ R ∩ S
c ∩ (K0 \Kθ) ⊂ R ∩ S
c ∩ (K0 \Kθ). (2.8)
Write
Kθ = (Kθ \K0) ∪ (K0 ∩Kθ)
= (Kθ \K0) ∪ [K0 \ (K0 \Kθ)]
= (Kθ \K0) ∪ [K0 ∩ (K0 \Kθ)
c]
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Now
A˜i,θ = Ai,θ \Kθ
= Ai,θ \
[











c ∩ [Kc0 ∪ (K0 \Kθ)]
]
= [Ai,θ ∩ (Kθ \K0)
c] ∩ [Kc0 ∪ (K0 \Kθ)]
= Ai,θ ∩ [K
c
0 ∪ (K0 \Kθ)] (∵ Equation (2.7))
= [(Ai ∪ R) \ S
c] ∩ [Kc0 ∪ (K0 \Kθ)]
= [(Ai ∪ R) ∩ S
c ∩Kc0] ∪ [(Ai ∪R) ∩ S
c ∩ (K0 \Kθ)]





c ∩ (K0 \Kθ)] ∪ [R ∩ S
c ∩ (K0 \Kθ)]
]
= [(A˜i ∪ R) ∩ S
c] ∪ [R ∩ Sc ∩ (K0 \Kθ)]
(∵ Equation (2.8))
= (A˜i ∪R) ∩ S
c
= A˜i ∪ R (∵ Ai,θ ∩ S = ∅).
So A˜1,θ = A˜2,θ 6= ∅ and the axiom still applies.
Case 4. Axiom I is case 1 or case 2 of the third axiom. Say player 1 wins G0,p.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that player 1 does not have a winning strategy
in Gθ,p. Then by Lemma 2.6.21, player 1 loses Gθ,p. This contradicts Lemma 2.6.28
since on the one hand there is a chain such that player 1 loses the game G0,p and
on the other hand the third axiom can be applied directly to G0,p such that player
1 wins.
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This completes the inductive construction.
Lemma 2.6.31. Suppose that 〈Gα | α ≤ γ + 1〉 is a reduction chain and at each
successor step Gα+1 is obtained from Gα by applying an axiom to a position qα.
Suppose further that qα extends a position p for all α < γ and qγ = ∅. I.e., for all
α < γ, Gα+1 are obtained from Gα by applying an axiom to a subgame of Gα,p and
Gγ+1 is obtained applying an axiom, say Axiom I, to Gγ.
Suppose that G can also be reduced to H by applying an axiom, say Axiom II,
at a position p. Then Axiom I can also be applied to H to get Gγ+1.
Proof. By Lemma 2.6.30 Axiom II is applicable to Gγ . Then by Lemma 2.6.29,
Axiom I is applicable to H .
Lemma 2.6.32. Let 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α 6 γ + 1〉 be a reduction chain for
G = G0 such that in the last step Gγ+1 is obtained by applying an axiom, say
Axiom I, to Gγ at the position ∅. Let p 6= ∅ be a position such that an axiom, say
Axiom II, is applicable to the subgame Gp at the position p. Suppose that no axiom
is applied to a subgame Gα,q for q 6= ∅ and q is extended by p. Then there exists a
reduction chain 〈Hα | α 6 δ〉 such that Hδ = Gγ and H0 is defined by
1. H0,p = The trivial game obtained by applying the axiom to Gp;
2. H0,q = Gq for q ∈ Y
<ω incompatible with p.
Proof. By Lemma 2.6.30, Axiom II is applicable to each Gα, α ≤ γ. Let G
′
α be
the game obtained by applying Axiom II to Gα. By Lemma 2.6.29, Axiom I is
applicable to G′γ. So the chain 〈G
′
α | α 6 γ + 1〉 is still a reduction chain except
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that it may have repeated terms. Delete those repeated terms as in () to get the
sequence 〈Hα | α 6 δ〉.
Theorem 2.6.33. Let G = 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α 6 γ〉 and H = 〈Hα =
〈B1,α, B2,α〉 | α 6 δ〉 be two reduction chains for the game G = 〈A1, A2〉 such
that G0 = H0 = G and Gγ, Hδ are trivial. Then Gγ = Hδ.
Proof. We define by induction, for each β ≤ γ, a reduction chain Hβ = 〈Hα,β =
〈B1,α,β, B2,α,β〉 | α 6 δβ〉 such that H0,β = Gβ and Hδβ ,β = Hδ.
In particular, in the sequence Hγ, we will have H0,γ = Gγ and Hδγ ,γ = Hδ.
But H0,γ = Gγ is trivial by assumption, so δγ = 0 and H0,γ = Hδγ ,γ. Therefore
Gγ = Hδ.
Let H0 = H.
Suppose that Hβ = 〈Hα,β = 〈B1,α,β, B2,α,β〉 | α 6 δβ〉 has been defined such
that H0,β = Gβ and Hδβ ,β = Hδ. We proceed to define Hβ+1 = 〈Hα,β+1 =
〈B1,α,β+1, B2,α,β+1〉 | α 6 δβ+1〉 such that H0,β+1 = Gβ+1 and Hδβ+1,β+1 = Hδ.
Since Gβ+1 is obtained from Gβ by applying an axiom to a subgame Gβ,pβ =
H0,β,pβ , for some pβ ∈ Y
<ω.
Let αpβ be the least ordinal such that the subgame Hαpβ ,β,pβ is trivial. Consider
two possibilities.
Case 1. αpβ is a limit ordinal. Gβ+1,pβ is obtained from Gβ,pβ by applying an
axiom to it. Hαpβ ,β,pβ becomes trivial by a reduction chain for H0,pβ = Gβ+1,pβ .
By Lemma 2.6.30. We know that Gβ+1,pβ = Hαpβ ,β,pβ . Apply Lemma 2.6.28 to the
sequence Hβ and T = Tβ = {pβ} to get a new sequence Hβ+1. It follows from the
lemma and the fact Gβ+1,pβ = Hαpβ ,β,pβ that H0,β+1 = Gβ+1 and Hδβ+1,β+1 = Hδ.
CHAPTER 2. GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION 53
Case 2. αpβ = α + 1 is a successor ordinal. Let Hα,β,q be the subgame such
that an axiom is applied to it to obtain Hαpβ ,β from Hα,β. Note that pβ, q cannot
be incompatible. Otherwise Hα,β,pβ would be trivial since what is happening in
the game Hα,β,pβ does not affect Hα,β,pβ since pβ and q are incompatible. This
contradicts the minimality of αpβ . So there are two possibilities.
Subcase 1. q extends pβ or q = pβ. As in case 1, by Lemma 2.6.30 we know that
Gβ+1,pβ = Hαpβ ,β,pβ since one is obtained from a direct application of an axiom and
the other is obtained from a reduction chain for the same game. Apply Lemma
2.6.28 to the sequence Hβ and T = Tβ = {pβ} to get a new sequence Hβ+1. It
follows from the lemma and the fact Gβ+1,pβ = Hαpβ ,β,pβ that H0,β+1 = Gβ+1 and
Hδβ+1,β+1 = Hδ.
Subcase 2. pβ extends q.
Apply Lemma 2.6.32 to the sequence Hβ and the subgame H0,β,pβ = Gβ,pβ to
get a new sequence Hβ+1. It follows from the lemma that H0,β+1 = Gβ+1 and
Hδβ+1,β+1 = Hδ, and also the fact Gβ+1,pβ = Hαpβ ,β,pβ .
Let θ be a limit ordinal. Let
Tθ = {pβ | β < θ and for all β
′ < θ, either pβ′ is
incompatible with pβ or pβ′ extends pβ}.
Apply Lemma 2.6.28 to the sequence H and T = Tθ to get a new sequence Hθ.
By the lemma H0,θ is obtained by replacing the subgames H0,pβ with Hαpβ ,β,pβ
for each pβ ∈ Tθ. Note that Gθ is can also be regarded as obtained from G0 by by
replacing the subgames G0,pβ with Gβ+1,pβ for each pβ ∈ Tθ. But we have shown in
the successor steps that for each pβ ∈ Tθ, Hαpβ ,β,pβ = Gβ+1,pβ . Therefore, by the
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lemma, H0,θ = Gθ and Hδθ,θ = Hδ.
This completes the inductive construction.
2.6.5 Proof of Theorem 2.5.2
Proof. In the following we shall use the set-representation of a strategy σ. σ will
consists of elements of the form 〈p, y〉 where p is a position for player 1 to move and
y ∈ Y . σ will satisfy the property that for each p a position for player 1 to move
there exists one and only one y ∈ Y such that 〈p, y〉 ∈ σ. So σ can be transformed
into a strategy S1 : M1 → Y by letting for each p a position for player 1 to move,
S1(p) = y where 〈p, y〉 ∈ σ. Since such y exists and there is only one such y,
S1 is well-defined. τ also satisfies similar property and can be transformed into a
strategy S2 for player 2.
We proceed in two steps to build σ and τ .
Step 1.
For any determined game G with a reduction chain 〈Gα = 〈A1,α, A2,α〉 | α ≤ γ〉
we define a set of partial strategies 〈σ(G), τ(G)〉 as follows.
For each p ∈ Y <ω, let αp be the least ordinal such that Gαp,p is trivial and,
αp = 0 or αp is a limit ordinal or αp = α + 1 is a successor ordinal and Gαp is
obtained from Gα by an application of an axiom to the subgame Gα,p.
We define a pair 〈σα, τα〉 for each α ≤ γ inductively such that
1. for all β < α, 〈p, y〉 ∈ σβ implies 〈p, y〉 ∈ σα.
2. 〈p, y〉 ∈ σβ and 〈p, y
′〉 ∈ σα, β ≤ α, implies y
′ = y.
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3. If αp = α then there exists an fp ∈ Y
ω such that
(a) fp ↾ k0 = p for some k0;
(b) for each k ≥ k0, an even number, 〈fp ↾ k, fp(k)〉 ∈ σα,
(c) for each k ≥ k0, an odd number, 〈fp ↾ k, fp(k)〉 ∈ τα;
(d) for each i, fp ∈ Ai if and only if Ai,αp,p = Np;
(e) if fp /∈ A2, then for all f ∈ Y
ω such that for each k ≥ k0, an even
number, 〈f ↾ k, f(k)〉 ∈ σα, f /∈ A2;
(f) if fp /∈ A1, then for all f ∈ Y
ω such that for each k ≥ k0, an odd number,
〈f ↾ k, f(k)〉 ∈ τα, f /∈ A1.
We then let σ(G) = ∪α≤γσα and τ(G) = ∪α≤γτα.
For each p such that Gp is trivial, i.e., αp = 0, fix an arbitrary set of strategies σp
and τp for player 1 and 2, respectively, in the subgame Gp. Let σ0 = {σp | αp = 0}
and τ0 = {τp | αp = 0}. Clearly 〈σ0, τ0〉 has the required properties.
Suppose that 〈σβ, τβ〉 has been defined for each β ≤ α such that the conditions
1-3 are satisfied. We now proceed to define 〈σα+1, τα+1〉 satisfying the requirement.
Consider the axiom, denoted by Axiom I, used in the successor step to obtain
Gα+1 from Gα.
Case 1. Axiom I is refined backward induction. Suppose the axiom is used for
a position p for player 1 to move. Let σα+1 = σα ∪{〈p, y〉}, where y is any element
of Y such that Npay ⊂ A1,α if such y exists, otherwise take an arbitrary y. Let
τα+1 = τα.
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Since Gα,pay is trivial, αpay < αp = α. So fpay is defined and, by induction
hypothesis, fpay ∈ Ai if and only if Ai,α,pay = Ai,α
pay
,pay = Npay. But, by the
axiom, Ai,αp,p = Ai,α,p = Np if and only if Ai,α,pay = Npay. Then, clearly, fp =
fpay ∈ Ai if and only if Ai,αp,p = Np.
If fp /∈ A1, then, for all y, A1,α,pay = A1,α
pay
,pay = ∅. By induction hypothesis,
fpay /∈ A1 for all y and for all f ∈ Y
ω such that such that for each k ≥ (k0 + 1),
an odd number, 〈f ↾ k, f(k)〉 ∈ τα, f /∈ A1. Note that τα+1 = τα, therefore for all
f ∈ Y ω such that such that for each k ≥ k0, an odd number, 〈f ↾ k, f(k)〉 ∈ τα+1,
f /∈ A1.
The rest of the requirement can be easily checked.
Case 2. The cooperation axiom is used in a subgame Gp. Pick an f ∈ A˜1,α,p ∩
A˜2,α,p. Let p = f ↾ k0 for some k0. Let
σα+1 = σα ∪ {〈f ↾ k, f(k)〉 | k ≥ k0
is an even integer and, for all y, 〈f ↾ k, f(k)〉 /∈ σα}
and
τα+1 = τα ∪ {〈f ↾ k, f(k)〉 | k ≥ k0
is an odd integer and, for all y, 〈f ↾ k, f(k)〉 /∈ τα}.
Subcase 1. There exists an integer k1 ≥ k0, chosen to be the largest possible,
such that for all y, 〈f ↾ k1, y〉 /∈ σα∪τα. Let q = f ↾ k1, then Gα,q is trivial and fq is
defined such that fq ∈ Ai if and only if Ai,α,q = Ai,αq,q = Nq. But f ∈ A˜1,α,p∩A˜2,α,p,
so f ∈ Ai,α,q and Ai,α,q 6= ∅. Therefore Ai,αq,q = Nq and fq ∈ Ai for each i. Let
fp = fq. Then for each i, Ai,α+1,p = Ai,αp,p = Np (by the axiom) and fp = fq ∈ Ai.
Subcase 2. For all k ≥ k0 and for all y, 〈f ↾ k, y〉 /∈ σα ∪ τα. Let fp = f . Then
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clearly fp ∈ Ai and Ai,αp,p = Ai,α+1,p = Np for each i.
For the cooperation axiom, conditions 3(e) and 3(f) are vacuously satisfied.
Case 3. Axiom I is case 1 of the third axiom. Say player 1 has a winning
strategy in a subgame Gp. Let σ
′ be a wining strategy for player 1 in Gp and τ
′ be
an arbitrary strategy for player 2 in Gp. Let
σα+1 = σα ∪ {〈q, y〉 | 〈q, y〉 ∈ σ
′ and,
for all y and for all q′ extended by q, 〈q′, y〉 /∈ σα}
and
τα+1 = τα ∪ {〈q, y〉 | 〈q, y〉 ∈ σ
′ and,
for all y and for all q′ extended by q, 〈q′, y〉 /∈ τα}.
Let f ∈ Y ω such that 〈f ↾ k, f(k)〉 ∈ σ′ ∪ τ ′ for each k ≥ k0, where k0 is the
length of p.
Subcase 1. There exists an integer k1 ≥ k0, chosen to be the largest possible,
such that for all y, 〈f ↾ k1, y〉 /∈ σα ∪ τα. Let q = f ↾ k1, then Gα,q is trivial and
fq is defined such that fq ∈ Ai if and only if Ai,α,q = Ai,αq,q = Nq. But f ∈ A1,α,p
since σ′ is a winning strategy. So f ∈ A1,α,q and A1,α,q 6= ∅. Therefore A1,αq ,q = Nq
and fq ∈ A1. Let fp = fq. Then A1,α+1,p = A1,αp,p = Np (by the axiom) and
fp = fq ∈ A1. That fp /∈ A2 and A2,α+1,p = ∅ is obvious since A2 = ∅.
Subcase 2. For all k ≥ k0 and for all y, 〈f ↾ k, y〉 /∈ σα ∪ τα. Let fp = f . Then
fp ∈ A1 since σ
′ is a winning strategy and A1,αp,p = A1,α+1,p = Np by the axiom.
That fp /∈ A2 and A2,α+1,p = ∅ is obvious since A2 = ∅.
For this case, conditions 3(e) and 3(f) are trivially satisfied.
Case 4. Axiom I is case 2 of the third axiom, similar to case 3.
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Let θ be a limit ordinal. Fix a y0 ∈ Y . Let
σθ = (∪α<θσα) ∪ {〈p, y0〉 | p ∈M1, αp = θ and ∀α < θ∀y ∈ Y, 〈p, y〉 /∈ σα}
and
τθ = (∪α<θτα) ∪ {〈p, y0〉 | p ∈M2, αp = θ and ∀α < θ∀y ∈ Y, 〈p, y〉 /∈ τα}.
For each p such that ap = θ, construct fp ∈ Y
ω inductively as follows.
Let p0 = p.
If pn is constructed and αpn = θ. Let pn+1 = p
a
n y0. Otherwise, αpn < θ, let
fp = fpn. Since no axiom is applied to subgames of the form Gq, where q = pk
for some k ≤ n, Gθ,pn = Gαpn ,pn. Since Gθ,p is trivial, so Ai,θ,p = Np if and only
if Ai,θ,pn = Npn . By induction hypothesis, fpn ∈ Ai if and only if Ai,αpn ,pn = Npn.
Therefore fp ∈ Ai if and only if Ai,αp,p = Ai,θ,p = Np.
Suppose that for all n < ω, αpn = θ. Let fp = p
aya0 y
a
0 · · · . Since no axiom is
applied to subgames of the form Gpn for some n, fp ∈ Ai,θ,p if and only if f ∈ Ai.
Since Gθ,p is trivial, so Ai,θ,p = Np if and only if fp ∈ Ai,θ,p. Therefore fq ∈ Ai if
and only if Ai,αp,p = Ai,θ,p = Np.
Suppose that fp /∈ Ai for, say, i = 1. Then A1,αp,p = A1,θ,p = ∅. Fix an f ∈ Y
ω
such that for each k ≥ k0, an odd number, 〈f ↾ k, f(k)〉 ∈ τθ.
Subcase 1. If there exists a k1 ≥ k0 such that 〈f ↾ k1, f(k1)〉 ∈ σθ ∪ τθ and
αf↾k1 < θ. Choose k1 to be the least possible. Since no axiom has been applied
to subgames of the form Gα,f↾k for some k0 ≤ k < k1 and for all αf↾k1 < α < θ,
A1,αf↾k1 ,f↾k1 = A1,θ,f↾k1 = ∅. By induction hypothesis for condition 3(d), ff↾k1 /∈ A1.
By induction hypothesis for condition 3(e,f), for all g ∈ Y ω such that such that for
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each k ≥ (k1 + 1), an odd number, 〈g ↾ k, g(k)〉 ∈ ταf↾k1 , g /∈ A1. In particular, f
satisfies the condition of g since ταf↾k1 ⊂ τθ. So f /∈ A1.
Subcase 2. If for all k ≥ k0, αf↾k = θ. Since no axiom has been applied to
subgames of the form Gα,f↾k for all k > k0 and for all α < θ, f ∈ A1,θ,p if and only
if f ∈ A1. By assumption A1,αp,p = A1,θ,p = ∅, so f /∈ A1,θ,p. Therefore f /∈ A1.
So conditions 3(e,f) still holds at θ.
Step 2.
Build strategies σ and τ step by step. Define the sequences 〈σα | α ≤ γ〉,
〈τα | α ≤ γ〉, γ to be determined, by induction. Then we let σ = ∪{σα | α ≤ γ},
τ = ∪{τα | α ≤ γ}.
Let σ0 = τ0 = ∅.
Suppose σα, τα have been defined. Suppose that σα, τα are strategies for player
1 and 2 already, i.e., for each p ∈ Y <ω a position for player 1 to move there exists
some y such that 〈p, y〉 ∈ σα and for each p ∈ Y
<ω a position for player 2 to move
there exists some y such that 〈p, y〉 ∈ τα. We then stop and let γ = α.
Otherwise pick some p with smallest possible length such that p is not in the
domain of σα or τα. That is, say p is a position for player 1 to move, 〈p, y〉 /∈ σα
for all y ∈ Y . Gp is determined by strict determinacy of G. Let σα+1 = σα ∪σ(Gp)
and τα+1 = τα ∪ τ(Gp).
If θ is a limit ordinal, let σθ = ∪{σα | α < θ}, τθ = ∪{τα | α < θ}.
To define σ and τ we only need to define an instruction 〈p, y〉 for σ or τ for each
p ∈ Y <ω. So we need at most |Y <ω|+ many steps of constructions, here |Y <ω|+ is
the next cardinal after the cardinality of the set Y <ω. So the process terminates
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at some stage γ ≤ |Y <ω|+.
Conclusion.
〈σ, τ〉 is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with the desired properties. Let
f = σ ∗ τ , it follows from 3(d) that f ∈ Ai if and only if Ai,γ = Y
ω. For each
p ∈ Y <ω, it follows from 3(e) and 3(f) that 〈σ, τ〉, with the domain restricted to
the subgame Gp, forms a Nash equilibrium.
2.6.6 Proof of Theorem 2.6.6
Proof. For each case we provide an example in which none of rest of the axioms is
applicable to a nontrivial subgame of it.
Case 1 of refined backward induction. Let Y = {L,R}, A1 = ∅, and A2 = NL
(see Figure 5).
Figure 5
(0, 1) (0, 0)
L R
Player 1
Case 2 of refined backward induction. Let Y = {Continue, Stop},
A1 = ∪{Np | p = (y0, y1, · · · , y2m)
& yk = Continue for k < 2m & y2m = Stop},
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and
A2 = ∪{Np | p = (y0, y1, · · · , y2m+1)
& yk = Continue for k < 2m+ 1 & y2m+1 = Stop}.
This game is depicted in Figure 6.
(1, 0) (0, 1)(1, 0)
(1, 1)
player 1 player 2 player 1 player 2
continue continue continue continue
stop stop stop stop
Figure 6
(0, 1)
The cooperation axiom. Consider the game in Figure 2.
Case 1 of refined backward induction. Let Y = {0, 1}, A1 = Y
ω. Let σ be a
t-strategy of player 2. Define A2 by letting, for each f ∈ Y
ω, f ∈ A2 if and only if,
for each k ≥ 0, (f ↾ k) ∈ σ.
Case 2 of refined backward induction, similar to case 1.
Chapter 3
PI-Games with Infinitely Many
Players
3.1 Introduction
Many of the dynamic models in economics involve an infinite number of individuals
whose interactions play a crucial role. For example in macroeconomics, quite often
the model is infinite horizonal. In the model infinite generations of individuals are
involved and decisions of current generations have an impact on that of the future
generations. Ideally one would want to formulate this using a pure game-theoretic
framework and apply the game theoretic solution concepts to derive the relevant
economic outcome. But neither the framework of games with an infinite number
of players is founded nor are appropriate solution concepts available.
In this chapter, we shall develop the notion of a perfect information game
with an infinite number of players. We shall also define a solution concept for
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this, namely the notions of determinacy, value and rational strategies. All these
are natural extensions of the theory developed for infinite PI-games with a finite
number of players.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We present the framework of
an infinite PI-game with an infinite number of players in section 2. The solution
concept for this PI-game is given in section 3. In section 4 we apply these to an
overlapping generation model. Section 5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 PI-games with an Infinite Number of Players
In this section we give the formal representation of a PI-game with an infinite
number of players. We shall also define the related notion of a strategy.
Let Y be a set of finite sequences such that if a finite sequence
p = (y0, y1, · · · , ym)
is in Y , then
1. for each k 6 m, the initial segment (y0, y1, · · · , yk−1), denoted by p ↾ k, is
also contained in Y ; p ↾ 0 is understood to be the empty sequence ∅;
2. there exists some ym+1, such that the sequence (y0, y1, · · · , ym, ym+1), denoted
by paym+1, is in Y .
Y is intended to be a game tree. An element p of Y is also called a position. For
convenience sometimes we also write y0y1 · · · ym for a position (y0, y1, · · · , ym) in
Y . A nonempty subset T of Y satisfying condition 1 is called a tree.
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Remark 3.2.1. Since Y is intended to be a game tree, so condition 1 is natural.
Condition 2, requiring that each path has to be infinite, is merely for technical
convenience. If there is a (y0, y1, · · · , ym) ∈ Y without any (y0, y1, · · · , ym, ym+1)
∈ Y , we can simply add to Y , without changing its game theoretic content, the
following elements: (y0, y1, · · · , ym, 0), (y0, y1, · · · , ym, 0, 0), etc.
Let F(Y ) be the collection of all infinite sequences
f = (y0, y1, · · · )
such that for all m ≥ 0, f ↾ m = (y0, y1, · · · , ym−1) ∈ Y .
Let
I = {0, 1, 2, · · · }
be the collection of all natural numbers. We shall use I to denote the set of players
in the game. Hence each player is labeled by a natural number.
Let
λ : Y → I
be a surjective map. The map λ is a rule that assigns a player λ(p) to move at
a position p ∈ Y . Hence p is also called a position for player λ(p) to move. λ is
surjective so that there is no vacuum players, i.e., each player moves at least once.
Each player i ∈ I is also assigned a payoff function
Φi : F(Y )→ R.
An infinite PI-game with an infinite number of players G consists of the following
data
〈Y, λ, (Φi, i ∈ I)〉.
CHAPTER 3. PI-GAMES WITH INFINITELY MANY PLAYERS 65
A play of the game is run as follows. First player λ(∅) begins by choosing y0,
with (y0) ∈ Y , next player λ(y0) chooses y1 such that (y0, y1) ∈ Y , then player
λ(y0y1) chooses y3 with (y0, y1, y3) ∈ Y , etc. Thus an infinite sequence
(y0, y1, · · · )
is specified. The payoff of player i after this play is Φi(y0, y1, · · · ) for each i ∈ I.
Remark 3.2.2. A player i that ceases to be active after certain moves, and his payoff
is constant from p onwards, can be interpreted as a player exits the game.
A strategy Si for player i is a subset of Y such that
1. ∅ ∈ Si;
2. let (y0, y1, · · · , ym) ∈ Si, if it is not a position for player i to move, then
(y0, y1, · · · , ym, ym+1) ∈ Y =⇒ (y0, y1, · · · , ym, ym+1) ∈ Si;
otherwise there exists a unique element, denoted by Si(y0, y1, · · · , ym), with
(y0, y1, · · · , ym, Si(y0, y1, · · · , ym)) ∈ Y
such that
(y0, y1, · · · , ym, Si(y0, y1, · · · , ym)) ∈ Si;
3. Si contains no other elements.
Remark 3.2.3. Condition 1 assures that Si is not empty and starts the recursive
definition in condition 2. If (y0, y1, · · · , ym) is a position for i to move, Si is required
to specify a move; otherwise all possibilities should be allowed. By abuse of notions,
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we also use Si as a function defined on all positions that player i is required to move,
to all possible moves. Condition 3 says that these are all that a strategy need to
specify. In particular, a strategy need not specify moves at inconsistent positions.
For example, if player λ(∅) decides to play y0 initially, then he does not need to
consider the moves at positions like (y′0, y1, · · · , yn−1, ) where y
′
0 6= y0. A formal
statement of condition 3 is that Si is the intersection of all subsets of Y satisfying
condition 1 and 2.
Let S = 〈Si | i ∈ I〉 be a set of strategies for the players. A play of the game
following the strategies S looks like this:
• First player λ(∅) plays, according to Sλ(∅), a move
y0 = Sλ(∅)(∅);
• then player λ((y0)) responds by, according to Sλ(y0), a move
y1 = Sλ(y0)(y0);
• the game continues so that an infinite sequence
(y0, y1, · · · )
is specified.
Denote by ∧i∈ISi the resulting play (y0, y1, · · · ) according to S.
Let G = 〈Y, λ, (Φi, i ∈ I)〉 be a game and let (y0, y1, · · · , ym) ∈ Y be a position,
we shall define the subgame of G at p = (y0, y1, · · · , ym). Let
Yp = {f | (y0, y1, · · · , ym, f(0), f(1), · · · ) ∈ Y }.
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Ip = {λp(q) | q ∈ Yp}.
For each i ∈ Ip and for each f ∈ F(Y ), let
Φi,p(f) = Φi((y0, y1, · · · , ym, f(0), f(1), · · · )).
The subgame of G at p = (y0, y1, · · · , ym) is the game
Gp = 〈Yp, λp, (Φi,p, i ∈ Ip)〉.
Let Si be a strategy for player i in G and i ∈ Ip, it induces a strategy Si,p on
Gp by
q ∈ Si,p ⇐⇒ p
aq ∈ Si.
The topology on F(Y ) is defined by taking the basic open neighborhoods to be
the form
N(y0,y1,··· ,ym) = {f ∈ F(Y ) | f(0) = y0, · · · , f(m) = ym},
for each (y0, y1, · · · , ym) ∈ Y .
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3.3 The Definition
3.3.1 Overview
A game G = 〈Y, λ, (Φi, i ∈ I)〉 is called simple if each Φi is a characteristic function,




1 if f ∈ Xi
0 if f /∈ Xi.
In this case, we usually write G = 〈Y, λ, (Xi, i ∈ I)〉 by replacing the payoff func-
tions by the underlying sets, Xis. And we shall also use the expression that player
i receives payoff 1 (or 0) and that player i wins (or loses) interchangely. A sim-
ple game G = 〈Y, λ, (Xi, i ∈ I)〉 is closed if each Xi is a closed set. We assume
throughout that all simple games are closed unless otherwise stated.
A game G = 〈Y, λ, (Φi, i ∈ I)〉 is said to be continuous if each Φi is a continuous
function.
By the determinacy result of a game G, or determinacy of G, we mean a col-
lection of answers to the following questions:
1. Is G determined? If yes,
2. What is the value of G, i.e., what is v(G)?
3. Can we define rational strategies for player i, i ∈ I? If yes, what are they?
As we shall see later, 1 and 2 are actually equivalent, i.e., a game is determined if
and only if the value of the game is defined. If the answer to question 3 is also yes,
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i.e., there exists at least one set of rational strategies 〈Si | i ∈ I〉, then G is called
strictly determined.
The goal of this chapter is to define the notion of determinacy for general PI-
game G = 〈Y, λ, (Φi, i ∈ I)〉.
This goal will be accomplished in two steps. In step 1, we shall define deter-
minacy for simple closed games. In step 2 we define determinacy for continuous
games. The connection between step 1 and 2 is that we shall first reduce the deter-
minacy of continuous game G = 〈Y, λ, (Φi, i ∈ I)〉 to determinacy of those simple
closed games 〈Y, λ, (Xi, i ∈ I)〉, where the Xis are defined by
Xi = {f | f ∈ F(Y ) & Φi(f) ≥ a}, (3.1)
and then use the results of step 1.
3.3.2 Step 1
A quasisolution is an assignment of a subset ap of I for each p ∈ Y such that
1. λ(p) ∈ ap ⇐⇒ ∃y(p
ay ∈ Y ∧ λ(p) ∈ apay);
2. i 6= λ(p), i ∈ ap ⇐⇒ ∀y(p
ay ∈ Y ∧ λ(p) ∈ apay =⇒ i ∈ apay) ∧ (∀y(p
ay ∈
Y ∧ λ(p) /∈ apay) =⇒ ∀y(i ∈ apay)).
Now associate to each quasisolution (ap)p∈Y a subtree T of Y .
1. ∅ ∈ T
2. if p ∈ T and λ(p) /∈ ap, then p
ay ∈ T for all y such that pay ∈ Y ;
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3. if p ∈ T and λ(q) ∈ ap, then p
ay ∈ T for all y such that pay ∈ Y and
λ(q) ∈ apay.
Similarly define Tq for each q ∈ Y .
A quasisolution is a solution if, for each q ∈ Y , the following two conditions are
satisfied.
1. Consistency requirement.
i ∈ aq ⇐⇒ |Tq| ⊂ Xi.
2. There exists no other quasisolution (bp)p∈Yq for Gq satisfying the consistency
requirement and bq ) aq, bp ⊇ ap for all p ∈ Yq.
Definition 3.3.1. A game G is determined if there exists a unique solution.
Definition 3.3.2. If G is determined, the value of player i in G, denoted vi(G), is
1 if i ∈ a∅ and it is 0 otherwise.
3.3.3 Step 2
Finally we are in a position to define determinacy for a general PI-game G =
〈Y, λ, (Φi, i ∈ I)〉. Assume throughout the rest of this chapter that for each a =
(ai)i∈I , where each ai ∈ R ∪ {−∞,+∞}, the induced simple game G(a) defined
with payoff sets
Xi = {f | f ∈ F(Y ) & Φi(f) ≥ ai},
for each i, is determined. We assume in this section that Ga is determined for any
a.
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We say that a = (ai)i∈I is secured if vi(G(a)) = 1 for each i.
Let p = (y0, y1, · · · , ym) ∈ Y . Define in the subgame Gp a set
Dp =
{










Define D′p as the collection of all (bi)i∈I such that
1. if p is a position for player i to move,
bi = sup{apaym+1,i | apaym+1 ∈ Dpaym+1}.
2. Now consider the case j 6= i. If there are some apaym+1 ∈ Dpaym+1 such that
bi = apaym+1,i,
then
bj = inf{apaym+1,j | ap,i = apaym+1,i};
Otherwise,
bj = lim infn→∞{apaym+1,j | ap,i − apaym+1,i < 1/n};
Let
D¯p = Dp ∪D
′
p.
Now define for game G a consistent solution s as follows. Let
s ⊂ ∪p∈Y D¯p,
so that for all p = (y0, y1, · · · , ym) ∈ Y , s satisfies the following properties
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1. there exists a unique ap ∈ s.
2. if p is a position for player i to move, and if ap ∈ s, then for all p
aym+1 ∈ Y
and apaym+1 ∈ s,
ap,i = sup{apaym+1,i | p
aym+1 ∈ Y }. (3.2)
3. Now consider the case j 6= i. If there are some apaym+1 ∈ s such that
ap,i = apaym+1,i,
then
ap,j = inf{apaym+1,j | ap,i = apaym+1,i};
Otherwise, let
ap,j = lim infn→∞{apaym+1,j | ap,i − apaym+1,i < 1/n};
Denote by s the collection of all such consistent solutions. If s is a singleton, write
s for the s in s, by abuse of notations.
Definition 3.3.3. The game G is called determined if s is a singleton. And a∅ ∈ s
is called the value of the game. If, in addition,
s ⊂ ∪p∈YDp,
then G is called strictly determined. In that case, call a strategy Si for player i
rational if for all p = (y0, y1, · · · , ym) a position for player i to move, p
aSi(p) is in
one of the rational strategies of player i in the simple game Gp(ap).
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3.4 An Application
Consider the following simple overlapping generation model. T = 0, 1, 2, · · · . At
each period t, t ≥ 1, an individual gt is born, who lives for two periods, t and t+1.
At period t gt is young, and gt is old at t+1. An old individual g0 exists at period
1.
When an individual is born at period t he is endowed with one unit of good
which he can either consume at period t or store for next period’s consumption.
There is a cost for saving goods for next period’s consumption, a fraction of 1−δ will
be decayed. So if an individual saves x amount of good he will have δx available
for consumption in the next period. Denote by xt,1 and xt,2 the consumption
of individual gt at period t and period t + 1. Suppose each gt has the utility
function ut(xt,1, xt,2) = min{xt,1, xt,2}. The old individual at period 0 holds a
special indivisible good M which does not decay over time and is equivalent to
a fraction, say D, where 0 < D 6 1/(1 + δ), of the ordinary good that other
individuals have for consumption. And the utility of g0 depends entirely on his
consumption at this period.
One possible pattern of the economy is that each individual consumes his own
storage at the period when he is old. So the optimal amount of storage is 1/(1+δ).
And each individual gets a utility of δ/(1 + δ).
Instead of directly consuming their own goods, it is possible for the old and
young individuals at period 1 to exchange certain amount of goods to increase
their utility. Suppose that they do want to exchange, they have to do so at the
fixed price 1/2 of the ordinary good, i.e., individual g1 gives half of what he have
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for M.
Once g1 has M at his hand, he will store nothing but M for next period if he
is sure that the same thing is going to happen next, i.e., individual g2 born at
the second period will exchange half of what he have for M so that g1 can again
consume 1/2 of the ordinary good. Thus his total utility will increase from δ/(1+δ)
to 1/2.
Having described the model and with this background in mind, now we rephrase
everything in game theoretic terminology. This would be an infinite-horizon game
with an infinite number of players. Again for simplicity, let’s assume that (1/2, 1/2)
and (δ/(1 + δ), 1/(1 + δ)) are the only possible divisions of the ordinary good.
Period 1, stage 1: g0 moves first. He has two choices: to consume M or to offer
an opportunity to g1 to exchange. If he chooses to consume M himself, the
game ends, all the individuals gt, t ≥ 1 has a utility δ/(1+ δ). If he takes the
second option, it is g1’s turn to respond.
Period 1, stage 2: g1 responds. He has two choices: to exchange or to say “no”.
If he chooses to exchange, he has to give 1/2 of what he has to g0 for M . So
the utility for g0 in this game is 1/2. g1 consumes the other half of what he
has and enters period 1 with M. If he takes the second option, the story has
the same ending as the case that g0 choosing to consume M in the stage 1.
Period 2, stage 1: The same story continues with g1, g2 taking the roles of g0,
g1. And the game continues in this way.
We abbreviate the actions by C and E. For the individuals holding M, C means
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to consume the good M, E means to offer the chance for the young individual
just born for exchange. For an individual that was offered such an opportunity, C
means to reject the offer, E means to accept the offer. Consider the following two
strategies:
Strategy 1 An individual always chooses “E”;
Strategy 2 An individual plans to choose “C” at his turn as long as the game
continues that long.
One can verify directly that both players playing strategies 1 and both players
playing strategies 2 are subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. But, if
we employ the notion of determinacy to investigate this game, we can see that
this game is determined and the value of the game is that of outcome of the first
equilibrium, namely the monetary equilibrium.
Remark 3.4.1. The special good M in the model captures the following features of
money.
1. M has certain value, or if an individual wishes he can exchange M with some-
thing that has value. This is modeled directly by that M is consumable.
2. M is durable or the cost of saving it is lower than that for other goods. This
is modeled by that M does not decay.
3. M is never consumed directly in the monetary equilibrium.
Remark 3.4.2. Dynamic inefficiency. The usual approach to dynamic inefficiency is
to introduce a planner that has the power to allocate goods in different generations.
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The outcome of Pareto improvement in the current model is the result of collective
intelligence, i.e., all the individual are rational and plays the monetary equilibrium.
Remark 3.4.3. It is interesting to note that when D < δ/(1 + δ), to exchange will
not be an optimal strategy if only a finite generations live in the world.
Remark 3.4.4. This model is basically a modification of Samuelson (1958). We
formulate it as a PI-game with an infinite number of players and apply the notion
of determinacy to derive the unique outcome.
Remark 3.4.5. Another part of the model that differs from Samuelson (1958) is
that money is endogenously derived rather than introduced in an ad hoc manner.
One disadvantage of using valueless money (goods that is not a source of utility) is
that at each period each new generation will have the incentive to issue their own




Turing machine has been one of the main tools in modeling bounded rationality
in game theory. Intuitively, a Turing machine is a computer program that can be
implemented by an ideal computer that is different from a usual computer only
in that it is assumed to have unbounded memory. The main idea is that in many
contexts, the players are not capable of playing strategies of arbitrary complexities.
A natural idea of a strategy being simple is a strategy that is implementable by a
Turing machine. Hence the class of Turing machine implementable strategies is a
natural restriction from bounded rationality perspective.
Besides being a useful tool in modeling bounded rationality, there are poten-
tially practical uses of considering Turing machine implementable strategies. In
many practical situations the agents playing the game, like computers, machines,
robotics, are not capable of playing arbitrary strategies. And Turing machine im-
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plementable strategies would be the ideal class of strategies to consider.
The literature has focused on effectivizing equilibrium concepts on normal form
games and repeated games.
In the case of normal form game, the effectivized Nash equilibrium requires that
the best response functions have to be computable (see, e.g., Rubinstein (1998)).
In repeated games, one can require that the strategies be computable (Nachbar
and Zame (1996); Rubinstein, (1998)) and, as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
the best response functions be computable (Nachbar and Zame (1996)). As shown
in Nachbar and Zame (1996), the second criterion is in general hard to be satisfied.
Instead of normal form games and repeated games, this chapter concerns infinite
games with perfect information.
Gale and Stewart (1956) is the first systematic study of infinite games with
perfect information. They showed that all closed games are determined (i.e., one
of the players has a winning strategy). The main purpose of this chapter is to
introduce an effective version of determinacy for infinite PI-games using the notion
of computability (by Turing machines).
The main result of this chapter is a characterization of effective determinacy
for closed games.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We sketch the main idea of a
Turing machine in the next section. In section 3 we define effective determinacy of
a PI-game. Section 4 proves the main result of the chapter.
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4.2 Turing Machine
Turing machines were invented by Alan Turing, the father of computer science, in
1936. He wanted to define what an algorithm is in precise mathematical terms.
His definition turned out to also be the most useful model of a computer to this
date.
Imagine a tape, infinite in both directions, divided into cells. Each cell can
contain the symbol “1” or it may be blank. For convenience, let us say that it
contains “0” if it is blank. For the time being we should think of the “1” symbol
as an uninterpreted vertical scratch and the “0” simply as the absence of a scratch.
These may be interpreted as the numerals for one and zero but they need not be.
Now imagine a device with a reading head that can move over the tape or draw
the tape through itself. The device scans one cell of the tape at a time. It can do
three things (formally called actions) to the tape:
1. read whether the cell being scanned contains “1” or “0”,
2. change “1” to “0” and vice versa, and
3. advance to the next cell to the right(R) or left(L) along the tape.
At any given moment device is supposed to be in one of a finite number of
internal states Q = {q0, q1, · · · , qn}. q0 is reserved for terminal state.
A program P is a finite (unordered) set of instructions, called quadruples, which
tells it what to do (2 and 3 above) depending upon what it finds on the tape (1).
Each quadruple must take form
qiSAqj .
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Then an instruction I = qiSAqj reads: “If the device is in state qi and the
current scanned cell is S ( either 0 or 1), then perform the action A ( write 1 to
the current cell if SA = 01, write 0 to the current cell if SA = 10; move one cell to
the left if A = L, to the right if A = R) and pass into the new internal state qj.”
A Turing machine is the device plus the tape plus the program. We follow the
convention in identifying a Turing machine M with its program.
To make M perform a computation, we print various symbols on the tape and
position the device so that a specified cell is being scanned; further, M must be set
in some prescribed initial state. This configuration constitutes the input. Then if
M is in the state qi and scans the symbol S, it acts as described above under an
instruction qiSAqj in P . This kind of action is then repeated for the new state and
symbol scanned, and so on. If M ever enters q0 during its operation it stops and
whatever is printed on the tape at that time is the machine’s output.
When we are dealing with numerical computation we need some effective cod-
ings, a way to read (or, to interpret the configuration of the tape). For example
we want M to compute a function
f : Seq→ Seq.
Here Seq denotes the set of all finite binary sequences. Then for each input p =
(p(0)), p(1), · · · , p(n)) ∈ Seq of f we write 1ap = (1, p(0)), p(1), · · · , p(n)) into
the tape as part of the configuration and reads the string after the left most 1 in
the tape as the output of the computation. We will call this a convention for f .
Similarly we can have convention for functions from N to N, from Seq to 2 = {0, 1},
etc.
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We can now define effective computability.
Definition 4.2.1. A function f from a domain A to B is said to be computable if
there exists a convention and a Turing machineM such that for each (a, b) ∈ A×B
and f(a) = b the machine terminates with output b for the input a (read under the
convention).
We say that a set is computable if its characteristic function is computable,
otherwise it is incomputable.
Proposition 4.2.2. There exists incomputable subsets of N.
In particular the halting problem is undecidable, i.e., the set
{n : n ∈Wn}
is incomputable. HereWn is defined as follows. If we have an effective enumeration
of the Turing machines that compute functions from N to N,
φ1, φ2, · · · ,
then Wn is set of all the inputs m ∈ N that φn can compute (i.e., terminates when
the input is m).
4.3 Effective Determinacy of PI-games
Let A be a set of infinite binary sequences, i.e., each f ∈ A takes the form f =
(f(0), f(1), · · · ), where each f(n) is either 0 or 1. Associated to the set A an infinite
game, GA, involving two players. The players alternate choosing elements of {0, 1}
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with player I moving first: player I chooses f(0), player II responds by f(1), player I
then chooses f(2), etc. Hence an infinite sequence f = (f(0), f(1), · · · ) is specified.
Player I wins just in case f ∈ A.
Let Seq be the set of all finite binary sequences. A strategy σ for player I is a
subset of Seq such that
1. ∅ ∈ σ;
2. let (y0, y1, · · · , ym) ∈ σ, ifm is even, then both (y0, y1, · · · , ym, 0) and (y0, y1, · · · , ym, 1)
are in σ; otherwise there exists only one element of {0, 1}, denoted by σ(y0, y1, · · · , ym),
such that
(y0, y1, · · · , ym, σ(y0, y1, · · · , ym, )) ∈ σ;
3. σ contains no other elements.
A strategy τ for player II can be similarly defined. It is also convenient to regard
a strategy as a (partial) function from Seq to {0, 1}.
If in condition 2 we do not require that σ(y0, y1, · · · , ym) is unique then we get
the notion of a quasistrategy.
A strategy σ is a winning strategy for player I if following σ player I always
wins, no matter how player II plays. The notion of a winning strategy τ for player
II is similarly defined. The game GA is determined if there is a winning strategy
for one of the players.
Let 2N, the set of all infinite binary sequences, be given the product topology,
i.e., the basic neighborhoods are of the form
Np = {f ∈ 2
N|f(0) = p(0), · · · , f(m) = p(m)},
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for each p = (p(0), p(1), · · · , p(m)) ∈ Seq.
For any A ⊂ 2N, an f ∈ A is said to be an isolated point if there exists some
(y0, y1, · · · , ym) ∈ Seq such that
N(y0,y1,··· ,ym) ∩ A = {f}.
If f is not an isolated point, then it is called a limit point. Denote by A′ the subset
of A such that every element is a limit point in A. A set A is called perfect if it is
nonempty, closed and A′ = A.
The games GA and the notion of determinacy were first introduced by Gale and
Stewart (1956). They also proved that all closed games, i.e., GA such that A is
closed, are determined.
We shall now define an effective version of determinacy for the game GA and
prove an analogous determinacy result in the next section.
Recall that a function from natural numbers to natural numbers is said to
be computable if there exists a Turing machine that implements it. Let Seq be
identified with natural numbers in one of the standard recursive ways. We said
that a strategy is computable if it is computable as a function.
Definition 4.3.1. A strategy σ of player I is computable if it is computable as a
(partial) function from Seq to {0, 1}.
Intuitively this corresponds either to the requirement that a strategy can be
described in finite terms or to the concept that a strategy should be mechanically
implementable. This restriction is interesting both in theory and in practice. The-
oretically this models the computational aspects of bounded rationality; practically
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in many situations the agents playing the game, like computers, machines, robotics,
are not capable of playing arbitrary strategies.
We say that player I wins GA in the effective setting if he possesses a computable
strategy σ such that for all computable strategy τ of player II, the resulting play,
denoted by σ ∗ τ , is in A. The situation for player II is defined in the similar way.
Definition 4.3.2. The game GA is called effectively determined if one of the players
wins GA in the effective setting.
For effective determinacy, we can ask the same question: for which A is GA
effectively determined? It is not hard to give an example that is not effectively
determined. This is in sharp contrast with the case of determinacy, since all known
examples of indetermined games require axiom of choice.
Example 4.3.3. Let K, L be two incomparable r.e. sets(see Soare (1987)). Each
move of player I in stage 2n is intended to be an answer to the question: “Is
n ∈ K ?” And similarly a move for player II in stage 2n + 1 is intended to be
an answer to: “Is n ∈ L ?” The payoffs are defined in the following way: If both
players answer all the questions correctly, then I wins; otherwise the first player
who makes a mistake lose. Since II wins if and only if I makes a mistake earlier
than him, each such instance is captured by a finite string p of length l, where l is
an odd number, such that for each 2n < l, p(2n) = 1 if and only if n ∈ K; for each
2n − 1 < l, p(2n − 1) = 1 if and only if n ∈ K; p(l) = 1 if and only if l /∈ K.
So the complement of A is the union of all open sets Np, where p has the above
property, hence it is open. Therefore A is a closed set. By the result of Gale and
Stewart (1956), it is determined. However, it is not effectively determined. For
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any computable strategy, say of player I, since it is bound to make mistake at some
stage (note that K and L are incomparable), say 2n, then the any strategy of player
II answers the first n + 1 questions regarding L correctly makes player II win the
game.
This shows that GA need not be effectively determined even for A closed. In the
following we shall give a characterization for those closed sets that are effectively
determined.
4.4 A Characterization of Effective Determinacy
of Closed Games
Lemma 4.4.1. Let f be an isolated point of A, then the effective determinacy of
GA is equivalent to that of GA\{f}.
Proof. Suppose that player I wins GA\{f} then it wins GA too since the payoff set
is larger now. Similarly if player II wins GA, it is going to win GA\{f}. So we need
only prove the other cases.
Suppose that player I wins GA we will show that he also wins GA\{f}. Let σ
be a winning strategy of player I in GA. Then for any strategy τ of player II,
σ ∗ τ ∈ A. We claim that σ ∗ τ ∈ A \ {f}, hence I still wins GA\{f}. Suppose,
towards a contradiction, that σ ∗ τ = f . Since f is isolated in A, there exists some
n such that Nf↾n ∩ A = f , where f ↾ n = (f(0), f(1), · · · , f(n − 1)). Since σ is a
winning strategy for GA and σ ∗ τ = f , the remaining part of σ starting from f ↾ n
is a winning strategy for the subgame of GA by restricting GA to the part starting
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from f ↾ n. But the payoff of I in this subgame is a singleton f , which he certainly
cannot win. This shows a contradiction.
Now assume that II wins GA\{f}. Since A¯ is open, and if f is isolated, there
exists some n such that Nf↾n ⊂ A¯ ∪ {f}. Let τ be a winning strategy for II in
GA\{f}, then it is easy to modify it for a winning strategy in GA.
Lemma 4.4.2. Let S be the set of isolated points of A, then the effective determi-
nacy of GA is equivalent to that of GA\S.
Proof. Since 2N is compact, the set of isolated points of A is finite. Applying lemma
1 finitely many times the result follows.
A tree T is a subset of Seq such that if (p(0), p(1), · · · , p(m)) is in T , then
(p(0), p(1), · · · , p(n)) is also in T for any n < m. If for some f ∈ 2N and all m,
f ↾ m ∈ T , we say that f is an infinite branch of T . A tree is called finite if the
cardinality of T if finite, otherwise it is called infinite. Given any closed set A ⊂ 2N,
we can define a tree TA representing A by
TA = {f ↾ n|f ∈ A & n ≥ 0}.
Lemma 4.4.3 (Ko¨nig). If T is infinite, then it contains an infinite branch.
Proof. See Srivastava (1998).
Lemma 4.4.4. If TA dose not contains any strategy of player I, then II has a
computable winning strategy.
Proof. If TA dose not contains any strategy, by the determinacy result of Gale and
Stewart (1956), II possesses a winning strategy (not necessarily computable), say
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τ . Then σ ∗ τ /∈ A for each σ. Let σ ∗ τ = f , since the complement of A is open,
there exists some n such that Nf↾n is contained in the complement of A. Choose
n to be smallest possible. Let F be the collection of all such f ↾ n, varying τ . Let
T be the smallest tree with all the terminal nodes in F . By Ko¨nig’s lemma, T is
finite, hence there exists a computable strategy of player II.
Define a sequence Aα inductively. Let A0 = A. Let Aα be defined. Let Aα+1
be (Aα)′. If λ is a limit ordinal, let Aλ = ∩α<λA
α.
Lemma 4.4.5. The effective determinacy of GA is equivalent to that of GAλ for
any countable limit ordinal λ if this holds for all α < λ.
Remark 4.4.6. The successor step is clear from lemma 2.
Proof. Suppose that I wins GA with σ. If I does not win GAλ , then there exists
some τ of II such that σ ∗ τ = f /∈ Aλ. Since for each such f there exists a least
α such that f /∈ Aα, let α0 + 1 be the least of all such α and the f corresponding
to α0 + 1 is f0. σ is still a winning strategy for GAα0 , but it fail to be a winning
strategy for GAα0+1, as is shown in the proof of Lemma 1, this is impossible.
Now suppose that II wins GAλ with τ . We modify τ such that it wins over all
of GAα, α < λ. Let τ0 = τ . Let τα be defined and τα is a (possibly incomputable
) strategy such that for all computable strategy σ of player I, σ ∗ τα 6= fβ for all
β < α.
Search for the least γ < λ such that there exists a computable strategy σ of
I such that σ ∗ τ = fγ . If such γ does not exists we are done, let τα = τβ for all
α < λ. Otherwise define τγ as follows.
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Since fγ is an isolated point in Aγ, there exists a least n such that Nfγ↾n∩Aγ =
{fγ}. Let τγ be a strategy such that τγ agrees with τα everywhere except at
the subgame starting from fγ ↾ n, where τγ avoids fγ and other fβ such that
fβ ↾ n = fγ ↾ n. This is possible since the collection of fγ and all fβ is only a
countable set (λ is countable) but Nfγ↾n is uncountable and other fβ are already
avoided by τα. Define τβ for all α < β < γ to be τ = γ.
Finally let τλ = lim
α<λ
τα. τλ is well-defined since each Np ∩ τ is modified at most
finitely many times.
So τλ is a strategy of player II such that for any computable strategy σ of I,
σ ∗ τ /∈ A. If τ is computable we are done. Otherwise we can apply lemma 4 to
get a computable winning strategy.
The following theorem guarantees that the iteration terminates.
Lemma 4.4.7 (Cantor-Bendixson). Aλ is either empty or perfect (i.e., nonempty,
closed and dense in itself) for some countable ordinal λ.
Proof. See Srivastava (1998).
Let λ0 be the least such ordinal and write A
∞ for Aλ0 .
Lemma 4.4.8. Let A ⊂ 2N be a closed set. Let σ be a computable strategy for
player I. Then I wins GA in the effective setting by σ if and only if σ ⊂ TA.
Proof. Let σ be a computable strategy such that I wins GA, i.e. for all computable
τ of player II, σ ∗ τ ∈ A. Suppose that |σ| ( A, then there is a strategy τ ′ of
player II (need not be computable) such that σ ∗ τ ′ /∈ A. Let σ ∗ τ ′ = f , note that
the complement of A is open, so there exists n such that Nf↾n ∩ A = ∅. It is then
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clear that τ ′ can be modified to be a computable strategy τ such that σ ∗ τ /∈ A, a
contradiction.
The other direction is clear.
Lemma 4.4.9. Let S be a maximal quasistrategy contained in TA, where A is a
perfect set. II wins G|S| if and only if he wins GA effectively.
Proof. Suppose τ is a (not necessarily computable) strategy of player II that wins
G|S|, i.e., for all computable strategy σ of player I, σ∗τ /∈ |S|. Let σ be computable
such that f = σ ∗ τ ∈ A \ |S|. By maximality of S, there exists a least n such that
Tf↾n contains no strategy of I in the subgame Tf↾n, hence it is possible to modify τ
to avoid f and also wins the subgame Tf↾n.
In this manner it is possible to modify τ so that it avoids all of A \ |S|. By
lemma 4 such τ can be chosen to be computable.
By lemma 7 we know that player I wins if and only if there is a computable
strategy σ ⊂ TA. If such a purification does not exist for him, then we have the
following.
Lemma 4.4.10. Player II wins if and only if there exists a computable strategy τ
such that for all σ ⊂ TA, σ ∗ τ is incomputable (as a partial function of σ).
Proof. Let τ be a winning, computable strategy of player II. Suppose that, for some
σ ⊂ TA, σ ∗ τ is computable, since σ ∗ τ ∈ A, it is easy to reformulate σ to be a
computable strategy that wins against τ ; This proves the necessity part.
Now let τ be such that for all σ ⊂ TA, σ∗τ is incomputable. Suppose that there
exists some σ computable such that σ ∗ τ = f ∈ A. By lemma 8 we can assume
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TA is a quasistrategy. So it is easy to modify σ to a (not necessarily computable)
strategy σ′ such that σ′ so that σ′ ∗ τ = f . This is possible since f ∈ A. Now f is
computable since both σ and τ are. This proves the sufficiency part.
If neither of them wins, then TA is a set that has the following property
∀σ, τ(τ is computable , σ ⊂ TA =⇒ σ ∗ τ is computable). (4.1)
So we have proved
Theorem 4.4.11. GA is effectively determined if and only if TA∞ does not satisfy
(4.1).
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we consider an effective version of determinacy. Not all games are
effectively determined, even for closed games. We prove a characterization result
for determinacy of closed games.
A paper closely related to this one is Deng and Mahajan (1997). They consider
a semi-effective version of determinacy in which only the first player is restricted to
using computable strategy. It is easy to see that the analysis in this chapter leads
to the same characterization as above with the computability of τ is removed.
Bibliography
[1] Binmore, K. G., M.J. Osborne, and A. Rubinstein (1992), “Non-cooperative
Models of Bargaining”. In R. J. Aumann S. Hart (eds.)Handbook of game
Theory with Economic Applications, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[2] Braˆnzei, R.(2000), “On the Determinateness of n-person games with infor-
mation energy”, Revue Roumaine de Mathe´matiques Pures et Applique´es, 45:
67-76.
[3] Davis, Morton. (1964), “Infinite Games of Perfect Information”, In: Dresher,
Melvin, Lloyd S. Shapley, and Alan W. Tuchker (eds.) Advances in Game
Theory, Annals of Mathematical Studies , 52: 85-101. Princeton, Princeton
University Press.
[4] Deng, X. and Mahajan, S. (1997) “The Cost of Derandomization: Computabil-
ity or Competiveness”, SIAM Journal of Computing, Vol.26, No.3, 786-802.
[5] Gale, David. (1953), “A theory of n-person games with perfect information”,
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U.S.A., 39: 496-501.
91
BIBLIOGRAPHY 92
[6] Gale, D. and F.M. Stewart (1953), “Infinite Games with Perfect Information,
Contributions to the Theory of Games”, Vol. II, Annals of Mathematical Stud-
ies, 28: 245-266.
[7] Kanamori, Akihiro. (2000), The Higher Infinite: Large Cardinals in Set Theory
from Their Beginnings, Berlin: Springer.
[8] Kechris, A. S. (1995), Classical Descriptive Set Theory, New York : Springer-
Verlag.
[9] Kuhn, H. W. (1953), “Extensive Games and the Problem of Information, Con-
tributions to the Theory of Games”, Vol. II, Annals of Mathematical Studies,
28: 193-216.
[10] Lo¨we, B. “Determinacy for infinite games with more than two players with
preferences”, Journal of Applied logic, Forthcoming.
[11] Martin, D. A. (1975), “Borel Determinacy”, Annals of Mathematics,102, 263-
371.
[12] Maskin, Eric and Tirole, Jean (2001), “Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Ob-
servable Actions”, Journal of Economic Theory, 100, 191-219.
[13] Mycielski, J (1992), “Games with Perfect Information”. In R. J. Aumann S.
Hart (eds.)Handbook of game Theory with Economic Applications, Amster-
dam: North-Holland.
[14] Nachbar, J. H. and Zame, W. R. (1996) “Non-computable Strategies and
Discounted Repeated Games”, Economic Theory, 8, 103-122.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 93
[15] Nash, J. F. (1950b), “Equilibrium Points in N-Person games”, Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences (U. S. A.), 36, 48-49.
[16] Osborne, M.J. and A. Rubinstein (1990), Bargaining and Markets, Academic
Press: San Diego.
[17] Romer, D. (2006), Advanced Macroeconomics, 3rd ed., Boston, Mass.:
McGraw-Hill.
[18] Rubinstein, A. (1982), “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econo-
metrica, 50, 97-109.
[19] Rubinstein, A. (1998), Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
[20] Samuelson, P. A. (1958),“An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with
or without the Social Contrivance of Money,” Journal of Political Economy,
December 1958, 467-482
[21] Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1984), “Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect
Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica, 52, 1351-1364.
[22] Selten, R. (1965), “Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodels mit
Nachfragetragheit”, Zeitschrift fur die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-
324.
[23] Selten, R. (1975), “Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium
Points in Extensive Games”, International Journal of game Theory, 4, 25-55.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 94
[24] Shell, K. (1971), “Notes on the Economics of Infinity,” Journal of Political
Economy , Vol. 79(5), 1002-1011.
[25] Soare, R. I. (1986), Recursively Enumerable Sets and Degrees, Springer-Verlag,
Princeton, New Jersey.
[26] Srivastava, S.M. (1998), A Course on Borel Sets, New York: Springer-Verlag.
[27] Sutton, J. (1986), “Non-cooperative bargaining theory: An introduction”, Re-
view of Economic Studies,53, 709-724.
[28] von Neumann, J. (1928), “Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele”, Mathematische
Annalen 100, 295-320. English Translation, Tucker, A.W. and Luce,R.D. ed.,
“Contributions to the Theory of Games”, Vol. IV, Annals of Mathematical
Studies 40, 1959.
[29] von Neumann, J. and Morgenstein, O. (1944), Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
[30] Wolfe, Philip. (1955), “The Strict Determinacy of Certain Infinite Games”,
Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 5: 841-847.
[31] Zermelo, E. (1913), ’Uber eine Anwendungen der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie
der Schachsiels’, Proceedings of the International Fifth Congress of Mathe-
maticians, Cambridge, 1912, vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
501-504.
